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Abstract 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has proved to be a contentious regulatory and political 
topic. Although key features were established within the law the complexity of the new 
provisions and political opposition resulted in a series of federal and state governmental 
process changes, rule clarifications, and legal challenges. One component of the ACA is 
the introduction of a federal Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), which requires insurers to spend 
specified percentages of their premium revenue dollars on medical services and quality 
improvement actions. If thresholds are not met, insurers must refund premiums to their 
members, potentially removing millions of dollars from their operating income in any 
given year. This research uses event study methodology to examine share price 
fluctuations for publicly traded health insurers to understand the relationship between 
legislative and regulatory events associated with the establishment of the ACA and the 
federal MLR requirements.  Regulatory developments in aggregate were found to be 
associated with slightly positive changes in share prices. Legislative events in aggregate 
were not associated with a significant change in share prices for publicly traded health 
insurers. Upon closer investigation, the initial draft of ACA legislation produced by the 
HELP Committee and sent to the Congressional Budget Office on June 9, 2009, 
including federal MLR requirements, was associated with a significant negative change 
in share prices for publicly traded health insurers. 
Keywords: Affordable Care Act, Medical Loss Ratio, event study, health 
insurance 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Five years ago, we declared that in America, quality, affordable health care is not 
a privilege, it is a right.  And I’ll never stop working to protect that right for those 
who already have it, and extend it to those who don’t, so that all of us can 
experience the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in this 
country we love.  (President Barack Obama, 2015) 
Today is an anniversary most Americans would rather forget. Five years ago, 
ObamaCare was forced on the American people after being sold on a series of 
lies. President Obama and his fellow Democrats broke their promise to make 
health care more affordable... ObamaCare has been a burden for families and 
small businesses, and as rates continue to rise, that burden is not going away. 
(Republican National Chairman Reince Priebus, 2015) 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA or the Act) has proved to be a contentious 
regulatory and political topic. The Act has been frequently discussed in popular media, 
political debates, and family living rooms across the country as citizens attempt to 
understand the implications of the 955-page Act (Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 2010). Signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010, the Act has far-
reaching implications for health care insurers, providers, employers, and taxpayers. 
Although key features were established within the law itself (United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2014) the complexity of the new provisions and political 
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opposition has resulted in a series of federal and state governmental process changes, rule 
clarifications, and legal challenges (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014).  
One often-overlooked component of the ACA is the introduction of the federal 
Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012), which requires insurers to 
spend specified percentages of their premium revenue dollars on medical services and 
quality improvement actions. If thresholds are not met, insurers must refund premiums to 
their members (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014a), potentially 
removing millions of dollars from their operating income in any given year. These 
requirements effectively limit the amount of administrative and advertising costs that an 
insurer may incur, and also limits their profitability. In response, several for-profit health 
insurance companies have exited this line of business (Ungar, 2011a). MLR calculation 
requirements are complex and resulted in several regulatory clarifications and 
developments subsequent to the passage of the ACA. The MLR is intended to manage 
premium and claims costs; as a result, this inherently will limit profitability for insurers. 
One would expect financial markets to monitor these requirements closely, and for share 
prices to respond to regulatory publications. This study attempts to understand whether 
this monitoring of regulatory actions and subsequent share price fluctuations occurred. 
While the popular press has provided a play-by-play analysis of ongoing events, 
academic literature has produced relatively little analysis of the Act and the MLR and the 
specific implications for publicly traded health insurers as it relates to their share prices. 
As a result, there is a significant amount of rhetoric but an absence of fact-based 
reporting and analysis regarding market response to ACA developments in general, and 
MLR developments in particular.  Share prices are an important indicator of the 
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sentiment of financial markets regarding the financial condition and long term viability of 
firms. By analyzing changes in share prices that occur around specific ACA legislative 
and regulatory developments, this study will create an academically-based, financially-
focused, play-by-play analysis of the ACA, and the MLR specifically, for public 
company health insurers.  
There are many ways that history will assess the ACA – how did it impact quality 
of care? Access to care? Cost to companies through employee fringe benefit costs? Cost 
to individuals? Cost to society as a whole? Profitability of healthcare industry 
participants, including insurers, care providers, and pharmaceutical companies? The 
answers to many of these questions are complex and require data that is not currently 
available, given the timing of this study. However, share prices of publicly traded 
companies are available on an immediate basis and provide an indicator of market 
sentiment. Through analyzing share prices, we may understand what the market thinks 
the cost, access, and profitability implications will be. While market opinion may deviate 
from actual outcomes, this initial “temperature check” of the ACA and specifically the 
MLR can still provide valuable insights.   
Through this analysis, we will be able to answer the following questions:  
1. What is the relationship between legislative developments related to the 
establishment of the Affordable Care Act and changes in share prices of publicly 
traded health insurers?  
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  12 
 
 
 
2. What is the relationship between regulatory events related to the establishment of 
the federal Medical Loss Ratio and changes in share prices of publicly traded 
health insurers? 
 
Statement of the Research Problem 
 The Affordable Care Act is arguably the most important political, legislative, and 
regulatory development for the healthcare industry within the last fifty years. The Act has 
significantly increased the access to health insurance for the previously uninsured (Health 
Affairs, 2016); estimates of the newly insured range from 7.0 million to 16.4 million 
(Blumenthal, Abrams, & Nuzum, 2015). In addition to the improvements in individual 
access and the need to support the care to these newly insured, the ACA has operationally 
impacted the industry through requirements to track and report performance metrics 
(Hader, 2015). Changes in payment methodology for healthcare insurers has increased 
the focus on quality outcomes rather than simply measuring services provided (Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010), with additional operational implications for 
insurers and providers. Given the nature and extent of these changes, understanding 
market responses is an important element of assessing the overall Act. The ACA has 
many potentially far-reaching implications, but the introduction of the MLR is of interest 
for one specific reason: it effectively limits the profitability of for-profit companies 
through political, legislative, regulatory, and judicial actions. The research questions that 
this paper addresses are if and how the financial markets reacted to these changes. 
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Assessing the ACA: Who Cares? 
 Public Company Health Insurers.  There are several well-established and 
publicly traded health insurance companies that are counted in the largest publicly traded 
companies in the United States. At the onset of the ACA, these include Anthem Inc. 
(ticker ANTM), Humana Inc. (HUM), Cigna Corp. (CI), Aetna (AET), and United Health 
Group, Inc. (UNH), among others. These five companies are actively traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and are members of the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 
500). In addition, there are 11 other health insurers that are publicly traded on the NYSE, 
based on established North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) or 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Combined, these 16 publicly traded health 
insurers had a market capitalization at December 31, 2015 in excess of $336.7 billion – 
an amount approximately three and a half times larger than the federal government’s 
spending for the Department of Education in fiscal year 2015 (Executive Office of the 
President of the United States, 2016). Of the ten largest health insurance groups by direct 
premiums written, all but four are publicly traded (Insurance Information Institute, 2016). 
The size and reach of public insurers is such that their financial viability is extremely 
relevant to the United States healthcare industry. Through evaluating changes in their 
share prices, we can better understand the relationship between the ACA and MLR 
requirements and their financial condition.  
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 Employers. Legislative and regulatory changes arising from the ACA are also 
extremely financially relevant to individual employers outside of the healthcare industry. 
According to an analysis based on data from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
the employer provided benefit with the largest average cost is health insurance, 
approximating 27.3% of total employer benefit costs on average (Schildkraut, Baker, Cho 
& Reuss, 2015). For the period from 2010 through 2014, annual increases in healthcare 
spending were 3.2% in comparison to a 5.6% rate experienced from 2000 through 2010 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2015). Assessing the impact of the ACA on the cost of 
overall healthcare is challenging due to the fact that its implementation coincided with an 
economic recession in the United States and may thus reflect normal fluctuations in 
spending patterns (Herring & Trish, 2015). Regardless, given the significance of 
healthcare spending by individuals, governmental agencies, and employers, there is high 
interest in the financial impact of the ACA (Herring & Trish, 2015). In particular, one 
way for insurers to manage their Medical Loss Ratios and prevent rebates to 
policyholders is by reducing premiums. Thus, understanding trends in MLRs is relevant 
to employers negotiating premium rates for their employees. 
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 Not-for-Profit Healthcare Organizations. This study also has important 
implications for not-for-profit healthcare organizations considering their financing 
options, which frequently include the issuance of publicly traded bonds; understanding 
the capital market response to ACA events may give an indication of overall market 
sentiment. Research has shown the decision-making process to be similar among 
healthcare industry not-for-profit organizations and for-profit organizations in regards to 
capital structure decisions (McCue & Ozcan, 1992; Wedig, Sloan, Hassan & Morrissey, 
1988). Further, many not-for-profits are participants in for-profit efforts, such as joint 
ventures and partnerships (Gray, 1993). There is also an argument that not-for-profit 
healthcare organizations are responsible for providing a form of return on investment 
similar to their for-profit counterparts (Sloan, Valvona, Hassan, & Morrisey, 1988). Thus, 
while this study is limited to public company insurers, it is relevant to not-for-profit 
organizations as well as they are also subject to MLR requirements and similar in many 
ways to their for-profit counterparts. 
 
How to Assess the ACA 
 In assessing the overall effect of the ACA in three broad categories (access, cost, 
and quality of care) Blumenthal, Abrams, and Nuzum (2015) examine the data and 
conclude that while the improvements to access to care as a result of the Act are clear, 
whether the Act has yet played a significant role in decreasing healthcare costs is 
uncertain. While there are some positive early indicators of improvements in quality, the 
authors are hesitant to conclude about the overall impact of the ACA in this area, stating  
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 If it is premature to draw conclusions about the cost effects of the ACA, it is 
doubly so for the quality effects of the law. The reductions in hospital-acquired 
conditions and Medicare readmissions since the enactment of the ACA are 
unprecedented and encouraging, but here again, the causes of these favorable 
trends are uncertain. It may be some time before we can assess the quality effects 
of this major new legislation. (p. 2458)  
As a result, it is difficult to assess the impact of the ACA on overall healthcare 
cost and too early to assess its impact on quality of care. Share prices fluctuations are one 
measure that may be evaluated contemporaneously. This “early indicator” of the financial 
evaluation of the ACA by market participants can offer valuable information that will 
provide one piece of the puzzle to individuals attempting to gauge the overall effect of 
the ACA. In sum: we cannot yet assess the overall cost implications or impact on quality 
of care, but we can measure what the market thinks about the ACA and the MLR. 
 
Relevance of Changes in Share Prices 
Given that the focus of this study is fluctuations in share prices, it is important to 
address the question of why share prices are important.  The reaction of the overall 
financial markets to the ACA and MLR represent an important consideration for those 
publicly traded organizations as they consider their business response to market changes 
and capital financing options. The business implications of changes in share prices are 
extremely complex and nuanced.  Certain of these implications include access to the 
capital market, the ability to attract and reward employees, stability of capital and surplus 
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from a regulatory perspective, and the ability to gauge the opinions of shareholders (as 
owners of a company) regarding the direction and actions of an organization. 
Share price fluctuations impact an organization’s ability to access capital on the 
financial market; in the case of insurance companies, this capital can be used to expand 
geographically or within targeted market segments and mitigate risk from this expansion 
through an increased capital and surplus equity base. Further, funds accessed through 
capital markets may be used to meet physical, technological, or regulatory infrastructure 
needs, as well as support increased levels of working capital.  
Share prices have been linked to capital structure, influencing the relationship of 
debt to equity within firms (Faulkender & Petersen, 2006); the ability to issue new shares 
at favorable prices provides an organization flexibility to determine whether they would 
like to dilute company ownership or assume additional debt. Of particular interest for 
regulated insurance companies is the level of capital and surplus, driving the calculation 
of Risk Based Capital metrics that are used by regulatory agencies to assess the solvency 
of insurers.  
Growth in share prices provides for opportunities to attract and reward employees. 
Stock options, which allow employees of publicly traded firms to take advantage of 
increases in share prices of their employer, are frequently used as a means to incentivize 
employees. The National Center for Employee Ownership estimated that in 2010, 36% of 
employees working for public companies owned stock or held stock options for their 
employer. These employees thus have a personal financial interest in the response of the 
stock market to their employer’s value. The use of stock options also has a favorable 
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impact on firm performance, particularly when granted at the executive level (Aboody, 
Johnson, & Kasznik, 2010). Thus, employees (or potential employees) may have a keen 
interest in monitoring the share price of their employer as it has personal financial 
implications. 
Share prices may also be used as a barometer to gauge shareholder sentiment. 
Shareholders, as the owners of a corporation, demonstrate their opinion regarding the 
financial solvency and profitability of organizations in part through their decisions to 
purchase or sell stock. An increase in stock prices reflects a higher level of demand in 
stock ownership. Low share price may result in executive turnover (Maury, 2006) or 
Board of Director changes (Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, & White, 2009; Maury, 2006;). 
Understanding share price changes that are associated with specific regulatory or 
legislative events may provide important information about the perception of 
shareholders regarding those targeted events and public health insurers. 
In short, share prices have many potential ramifications for publicly traded 
companies, and in the case of the ACA and MLR, for publicly traded health insurers in 
particular. Understanding the market response to specific events and actions assists not 
only individual firms but also their investors in assessing risks and opportunities. In the 
case of publicly traded health insurers, as regulated entities with a strong focus on 
monitoring and forecasting capital and surplus, this is particularly relevant. Thus, a 
thorough analysis of the ACA and the MLR, and a potential relationship to changes in 
share prices of publicly traded insurers, is merited.  
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A Unique Legislative Process 
The Act was unusual in that it is representative of ad hoc legislating, in which the 
House of Representatives and the United States Senate passed two separate pieces of 
legislation: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. (Throughout this analysis, these will be 
collectively referred to as the Act or the ACA.) As outlined by Cannan (2013), President 
Obama outlined principles and objectives for the House and Senate to incorporate into a 
health care bill, and both legislative bodies proceeded to work on their separate forms of 
legislation in 2009. This resulted in a significant amount of uncertainty and 
administrative processing required to move the rules through multiple Committees and 
legislative bodies (termed “ping-ponging” through the House and Senate). At each stage 
of the legislative process, a “temperature check” of the market can be taken – as the ACA 
legislatively progressed, how did the market assess likelihood of passage and what was 
the relationship to changes in  share prices of insurers? This study attempts to answer 
these questions. Certain event dates used in this study relate to legislative developments 
that made passage of the ACA appear more or less likely. The current potential period of 
evaluation for publicly traded health insurers thus encompasses activity from President 
Obama’s election in November 2008 to the ACA’s five year anniversary in March 2015.  
 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this study is to answer important questions for the Affordable 
Care Act and in particular the MLR: what is their relationship to the share prices of 
publicly traded health insurers? Specifically:  
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1. What is the relationship between legislative developments related to the 
establishment of the Affordable Care Act and changes in share prices of publicly 
traded health insurers?  
2. What is the relationship between regulatory events related to the establishment of 
the federal Medical Loss Ratio and changes in share prices of publicly traded 
health insurers? 
Share prices have ramifications for organization’s access to capital, their ability to 
attract and reward employees, and also serve as a barometer of shareholder (owner) 
opinions. Share prices may also be evaluated contemporaneously and do not have the 
inherent data lag that exists when measuring access and overall quality and cost of 
healthcare. The relationship between events and share prices will be measured using 
event study methodology to evaluate key announcements and clarifications associated 
with the Accountable Care Act and the Medical Loss Ratio requirements. Each event will 
be assessed to determine if it had a measurable relationship to the changes in closing 
daily stock price of United States publicly traded health insurers, controlling for overall 
market performance. Through this analysis, overall trends of market perception of the 
ACA and MLR provisions will become apparent. Events will be categorized as 
legislative or regulatory, and evaluated in a three-day event window for the period before 
and after an event.  
Binder (1985) identifies several factors that make regulatory event studies more 
challenging than other types of event studies, such as those used to evaluate company 
announcements. Specifically, regulatory events frequently lack a well-defined 
announcement, given that the legislative and administrative processes are time intensive 
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in nature. Binder (1985) also states that regulatory announcements are more likely to be 
anticipated in advance of their official publication date, and are likely to impact multiple 
companies within an industry. Given these acknowledged challenges, specific care will 
be taken to incorporate the findings of Binder (1985), Mulherin (2007), and Lamdin 
(2001) as they apply to using event study methodology for regulatory events.  
To answer the research questions, closing share prices of 16 United States 
publicly traded health insurers will be assessed and a Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Return (CAAR) will be calculated to determine if there were abnormal stock returns in 
the periods in which events associated with the Affordable Care Act occurred. All 
selected insurers have been actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
during the period from November 4, 2008 (the date of President Obama’s initial election) 
through March 23, 2015, the five-year anniversary of the ACA. These results will be 
considered in light of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which provides insights into how 
financial markets incorporate information into share prices. 
The following specific hypotheses will be evaluated: 
H1: Cumulative average abnormal price returns (compared to the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index) for public company insurers will be less than zero for 
the period -3 to +3 for legislative events.  
H2:  Cumulative average abnormal price returns (compared to the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index) for public company insurers will be less than zero for 
the period -3 to +3 for regulatory events. 
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Definitions of Terms 
 In order to proceed with the remainder of this analysis, it is important for the 
reader to have an understanding of certain terms relevant to the Affordable Care Act, the 
companies selected for analysis, and efficient market theory. 
NAICS and SIC Codes. In 1997, the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) replaced the Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) as a means 
to classify and organize businesses within the United States. Developed by the Office of 
Management and Budget, industry classifications are established based on economic 
significance and with a production-focus, grouping organizations based on the processes 
they use to produce goods and services (Office of Management and Budget, 2002). 
Organizations are classified based on their primary business activity as represented by 
production costs or capital investment; alternatively, revenue or employment may also be 
used. NAICS codes are six digits, with the most recent classification relating to 2012 
(United States Census, 2015). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) continues 
to use SIC codes (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015) and thus both 
classification systems are relevant considerations for the purposes of selection of 
companies within this study. 
Medical Loss Ratio. As discussed previously, one component of the ACA relates 
to a required Medical Loss Ratio calculation that became effective in 2012 (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014a). This calculation is performed by insurers for 
specific lines of business (for example, individual, small and large group) to measure the 
ratio of insurance premium revenue to medical claims expense and certain quality 
improvement expenses. Should this ratio fall below 80% for individual and small groups, 
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or 85% for large groups, insurers must issue rebates to the individual policyholders. 
Given the complexity of the requirements, a series of technical appendices, corrections, 
and clarifications were issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
from December 1, 2010 continuing through its implementation (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2015). 
Efficient Capital Markets. An important underlying assumption of the event 
study method relates to how capital markets respond to information. Fama’s 1970 
foundational work in this area supported three categories of market efficiency and how 
share prices reflect information. These three categories include strong form markets, 
which are assumed to reflect both private and public information, semi-strong form 
markets, which reflect all publicly available information, and weak form markets, which 
assumes that market pricing reflects only historical information. An understanding of 
these three assumptions on market pricing is relevant given that event study methodology 
seeks to understand how share prices relate to events; should a capital market prove to be 
weak in form, this methodology would be invalidated. The work of Fama (1970) and as 
updated by Fama (1991), and other researchers in a wide variety of geographic and 
industry-specific markets, uphold the concept of an efficient capital market. This will be 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 2. 
 
Delimitations 
 Given the scope of the timeline involved in this analysis and the overall intention 
to focus on United States publicly traded insurers, there are some clear delimitations 
imposed upon this analysis. Specifically, this study excludes the potential impact on non-
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United States insurers that may be incidentally affected by the ACA, such as insurers of 
Canadian or Mexican members who are visiting the United States. Private and not-for-
profit insurers are also excluded from this study, as they do not have readily available 
share prices for consideration. However, evaluation of the impact of the ACA on these 
organizations represents a valuable field for future study.  
The relationship of events associated with the ACA and capital debt pricing is 
excluded from this analysis given the variables associated with interest rate and 
company-specific risks. Since researchers have recognized that there might be value in 
assessing the impact of events on publicly traded debt (Peterson, 1989), this may be an 
opportunity for a future area of study. In a similar manner, stock option pricing is 
excluded from this analysis. Finally, as this is a quantitative analysis that is focused 
exclusively on share prices, the qualitative impact of the ACA on the employees and 
members of the health insurers is outside of this examination.  
This study is not intended to assess the relationship between the ACA and cost to 
employers in the form of fringe benefits, individuals or society as a whole; further, it is 
not intended to address the strategic implications of the ACA as an outcome of changes 
in share prices. Merger and acquisition activity, participation in various lines of business, 
and executive or Board turnover may reasonably result from changes introduced by the 
ACA and share price fluctuations, and may prove to be opportunities for future study. 
However, they are outside of the scope of this research.  
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Assumptions & Limitations 
 Many of the limitations underlying this study relate to responses to the inherent 
challenges in using event study methodology to evaluate regulatory and legislative 
events, which assume efficient capital markets. As outlined previously, these include 
assessing when information was first made available to the market, the likelihood of the 
anticipation of regulatory events, and whether the regulatory events were associated with 
share price fluctuations that are significant for individual firms versus to an industry as a 
whole (Binder, 1985). Mulherin (2007) acknowledges the standard challenges in 
quantitative studies of endogeneity (variables that relate to one another and create a 
circular effect), confounding events (events outside of measured variables that are 
creating changes in share prices), and data imprecision. However, he also calls out the 
lengthy and noisy nature of the regulatory process as proving problematic for the use of 
event study methodology when evaluating regulatory events. Doyle (1985) specifically 
evaluates the impact of agency rulings on the share prices of firms with positive results; 
given that agency rulings are potentially more opaque to financial markets (assuming a 
semi-strong form of market efficiency), the use of event study methodology was upheld.  
Confounding variables represent a challenge for event studies in general, and for 
those addressing legislative, or regulatory studies in particular (Larker, Ormazabel, & 
Taylor, 2011). While steps can be taken to identify and assess confounding variables, it is 
impossible to perform an exhaustive search. This research will perform certain 
procedures through review of market drivers, but this remains a significant limitation. 
Specifically, a technique utilized by Larcker et al., (2011) will be utilized. This approach 
includes identification of obvious confounding variables through a review of the Wall 
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Street Journal business financial markets section for the subsequent day to understand 
what were identified as the key drivers of overall market fluctuations. This is not 
considered a complete search for confounding variables but is a method intended to 
identify significant items that would require the research approach to be adjusted. 
Examples of potential confounding variables would include events that would potentially 
have an impact on healthcare industry participants that are more significant than other 
financial market participants. Examples could include such items as outbreaks of 
diseases, shortages of key pharmaceuticals, new or revised healthcare regulations not 
within the scope of this study, events specific to individual companies within the insurer 
portfolio unrelated to the ACA, etc.  
Event studies also commonly pose challenges with assumptions made by the 
researcher, including event windows, selection of market indices, and an appropriate 
selection of companies to evaluate. Like many quantitative studies, the challenges of 
confounding variables and clustering of events must be addressed. Accordingly, special 
care will be taken in determining event dates, estimation windows, the selection of a 
market index, and other underlying assumptions, to be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. 
Many of the event dates will relate to regulatory agency announcements and clarifications 
and the use of the event study methodology is supported in these instances. 
 Additionally, since this analysis is limited to the identified publicly traded 
healthcare companies within the United States based on their shared NAIC or SIC code, 
limited extensions of these conclusions can be made to other for-profit or not-for-profit 
healthcare entities. Potentially significant differences in size, geographic coverage, and 
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policyholder concentrations may exist and make comparison to other organizations 
inaccurate.  
 As Reynolds (2008) demonstrated in her analysis of the Byrd Amendment and 
United States anti-dumping laws, market response to new regulation does not necessarily 
demonstrate or reflect the true financial effect of regulation on organizations. While the 
markets may initially favorably or unfavorably respond to the provisions and 
developments associated with the ACA, the eventual financial and operational impact on 
the organizations evaluated may differ from the initial market response. Accordingly, this 
paper does not seek to understand the overall impact of the ACA on publicly traded 
insurers but simply is an assessment of the financial market’s initial response to their 
requirements. 
 
Significance of Study 
As ACA and MLR developments have been continuously unfolding since 
President Obama’s election and the Act’s eventual passage in 2010 and through the 
ACA’s fifth anniversary, academic literature has yet to fully evaluate its impact on 
publicly traded health insurers. While play-by-play journalism is featured in popular 
newspapers and editorials abound online and in print, pure academic analysis is still in 
the process of catching up. Additionally, literature regarding the role of government 
institutions and regulatory events on an international scale is not directly applicable to the 
United States. The traditional United States healthcare model is unlike that used by other 
first-world countries (Pink, Brown, Studer, Reiter, & Leatt, 2006). This event study will 
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assist in understanding the United States’ financial market’s response to ACA events and 
the MLR requirements in particular, and will be of use to those both seeking an 
understanding of the historical ramifications of the ACA as well as considering potential 
implications of future regulatory clarifications associated with the Act. These 
implications will be grounded in an understanding of market theory, to allow the reader 
to understand how publicly traded health insurers may navigate and consider the 
implications of financial market response. 
As discussed previously, share prices play a critical role for public companies in 
many ways, including access to capital, ability to attract and reward employees, 
providing stability in capital and surplus, and as a reflection of shareholder opinion. 
Isolating events associated with the ACA and their relationship to changes in share prices 
thus provide important information to these constituents as they assess the political, 
regulatory, and legislative components of the Act. Additionally, researchers are 
attempting to assess the overall impact of the Act but recognize that data lags and 
confounding events complicate this assessment. Understanding the relationship to 
changes in share prices of directly affected firms can be done on a more timely basis and 
also provide valuable insights about the intended and unintended consequences of this 
Act. 
 
Researcher Perspective 
 As an employee of a not-for-profit health insurer during the implementation of 
certain ACA provisions, I have witnessed the significant financial impact of these 
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regulatory events on my employer. The combination of additional taxes, MLR 
requirements, and the uncertainty of offsetting revenue streams such as reinsurance, risk 
corridor, and risk adjustment payments have led me to question how the financial markets 
will react to these issues for my employer’s publicly traded insurance competitors. While 
my personal beliefs represent a bias towards the provision of not-for-profit healthcare, the 
use of valid quantitative measurements in this study will prevent subjective bias from 
impacting the overall results. 
 In particular, I personally question the application and impact of MLR 
requirements on public insurers – this essentially transforms these companies into not-
for-profit organizations, or limited-profit organizations. Is the government essentially 
affirming the role and importance of not-for-profit healthcare organizations? Has the 
financial market fully grasped the implications of these changes? These are questions I 
seek to answer and better understand through the course of this study. 
 
Chapter 1 Overview 
 As discussed previously, the intention of this chapter was to introduce the 
research problem and questions at hand, as well as define key terms, delimitations and 
assumptions. With this information providing the foundation of the issue, Chapter 2 will 
link the research questions to relevant academic and popular press literature.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Academic literature has struggled to assess and evaluate the implications of the 
Act in a timely manner. As a result, literature considered in this review will include 
relevant articles from both academic journals and the popular press. 
 
Evaluating the ACA 
The ACA has served to increase access to health insurance (Health Affairs, 2016), 
required new reporting of performance metrics (Hader, 2015), and introduced new 
payment methodologies (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010). The 
combination of these and other factors introduced by the ACA creates a changing 
landscape for the healthcare industry. Popular business articles currently address the 
business responses of insurers to the ACA provisions; for example, recent publications 
have addressed insurer’s strategic tactics to reach the newly insured (Nussbaum, 2013), 
including the opening of retail health insurance storefronts, as well as how the insurers 
plan to manage their costs in the new MLR environment, in part through focusing on 
wellness activities and behavior-change programs (Goldman, 2011). Much has been 
made of insurers’ cancellation of plans that pre-dated the ACA requirement. While 
insurers and their members had the option to continue their non-ACA compliant plans 
under the “keep your plan” provisions, due to a changing business landscape many 
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insurers, including Humana, opted to terminate legacy plans, much to consumers’ dismay 
(Radnofsky & Mathews, 2014).  
A perceived lack of health insurance options on public exchanges in some 
markets is also drawing concern, with the identified driver of the lack of competition 
directly resulting from public company motivations. Wendell Potter, an industry 
watchdog, is quoted as saying, “This is brand new and insurers are really risk adverse. 
They don’t know how the market will behave, so the for-profit companies in particular 
are going to be sitting this out. Shareholders have no patience for this kind of 
uncertainty” (Jayne & Paul, 2014). This viewpoint aligns with the actions taken by Aetna 
and United Health Group, who initially opted to limit their participation in the new 
healthcare exchanges. Insurers have also drawn criticism from their fierce opposition to 
the ACA; from 2008 to 2010, the five insurers with the highest market capitalization 
included within this analysis (Aetna, Cigna, Humana, WellPoint/Anthem, and United 
Health Group) spent approximately $50 million in Congressional lobbying efforts 
(Fraser, 2014). Articles incorporated interviews with for-profit insurance company 
representatives and highlighted their comments regarding the ACA and its expected 
negative impact on consumers and on the healthcare industry (Angell, 2013; Lawrence, 
2013; Weixel, 2014).  
As the Supreme Court ruled in 2012 on the legality of the “individual mandate”, a 
provision requiring all individuals to have health insurance or pay a tax, Aetna, Humana 
and United Health Group were quick to issue press releases in advance of the ruling to 
announce that regardless of the ruling, they would retain certain popular provisions 
established by the ACA, including no copays on preventative health services, levels of 
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dependent coverage, and elimination of lifetime healthcare limits (Zigmond, 2012). 
These responses were well documented in the popular press. Proactive announcements 
such as these may serve to mitigate the volatility in share prices surrounding such 
significant ACA developments, however, analysis has not yet been performed to broadly 
assess market response to these insurer actions. These actions do indicate the strategic 
analysis that the insurers are undergoing as they attempt to navigate the uncertainty 
created by the ACA and its ongoing regulatory developments. 
 
For-Profit vs. Not-for-Profit 
 The provisions of the ACA also served to resurface an ongoing debate regarding 
the role of for-profit companies within the healthcare industry. As discussed previously, 
the new MLR requirements are one element of this debate. Rhetoric on this topic is 
frequently passionate and divisive: 
Investors and the companies themselves view expenditures to cover medical 
procedures as financial losses… This is the fatal flaw. Many of those charged to 
fund medical care are incentivized by corporate and fiscal law to find ways to 
deny coverage… This places the company in a position to maintain a medical loss 
ratio in keeping with shareholder and investor expectations, not to mention 
mammoth executive compensation linked to stock performance. (Maher, 2012, p. 
15)  
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Colombo (2006) questions, “Is tax exemption… ‘buying’ charity care for the poor, and 
would withdrawal of exemption negatively impact health care for the uninsured poor?” 
(p. 623)  
Indeed, there are inherently different incentives for health insurers that are 
otherwise comparable except for their for-profit status. “As distinct legal forms, nonprofit 
and for profit ownership leads to different mixes of monetary and nonpecuniary 
incentives for administrators and staffs, different sources of capital, and different 
influences on governance” (Schlesinger & Gray, 2006, p. 288). Whether this translates 
into differences at an operational level, including quality, price, and overall community 
benefit, is a separate question, and one that has been analyzed in numerous studies 
predating the ACA ( Rosenau & Linder, 2003; Schlesinger, Gray & Bradley, 1996; 
Schlesiner, Mitchell & Gray, 2003).  
Certain of these studies address Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO’s) 
directly: Schlesiner et al.  (2003) found that nonprofit HMO’s surpass their for-profit 
counterparts only in the areas of redistributive programs, such as general philanthropy, 
medical research, and wider community programs, while for-profit insurers are better at 
assisting their members with information asymmetries such as understanding healthcare 
options. This is consistent with Schlesinger, Gray, & Bradley (1996) study results, which 
found that non-profit insurers are more “community oriented” but in other areas 
differences between the two ownership structures are less significant. Schlesinger, 
Mitchell, & Gray (2004) further evaluated the American public perception of for-profit 
versus not-for-profit HMO’s, finding that the majority of individuals believe nonprofit 
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health plans and hospitals to be more trustworthy and fair, but of lower quality than their 
for-profit equivalents.  
Other studies have focused their efforts on healthcare providers, such as hospitals; 
Rosenau & Linder’s 2003 meta-analysis of 149 studies comparing for-profit and not-for-
profit hospitals incorporated specific performance criteria of access, quality, cost 
efficiency, and charity care within the community. Of the studies analyzed, non-profits 
were found to be superior approximately 59% of the time, with for-profits reporting 
better results in only 12% of cases. The remaining 29% demonstrated inconclusive 
results. Accordingly, while there continue to be debates about market-generated 
incentives, access to capital, impact to the overall community, etc., academic literature 
has demonstrated that non-profits are able to compete successfully with their for-profit 
counterparts in a variety of areas.  
 
Insurance Alternatives 
 While the ACA has obvious implications for many healthcare organizations, as 
discussed previously, there are certain elements, including the MLR, that do not apply to 
all healthcare organizations. In light of the religious controversy regarding the ACA’s 
required contraceptive coverage, as well as the costs associated with ACA-compliant 
plans, alternatives to traditional insurance have appeared in the market. Health Care 
Sharing Ministries (HCSMs) serve as “a health care cost sharing arrangement among 
persons of similar and sincerely held beliefs” (Boyd, 2013, p. 220). These HCSMs 
receive no funding from grants or government sources and are not regulated as insurance 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  35 
 
 
 
companies by the state or federal government as they do not assume any risk for medical 
claims, nor do they guarantee payment of bills. The Alliance of Health Care Sharing 
Ministries reports that as of fall 2014, over 300,000 individuals participated in a HCSM; 
by doing so, they were exempt from the individual mandate. Literature exists that 
analyzes the legal categorization of these organizations outside of insurance company law 
(Eastman, 2010), the tax law governing such organizations (Roane, 2014), and whether 
the organizations represent a valid option for individuals seeking health coverage (Boyd, 
2013).  These HCSMs are not required to report on their MLRs nor are they subject to 
premium rebate requirements (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015).  
 A second alternative to large, traditional insurers are nonprofit, member-owned 
health insurance cooperative entities that operate within state exchanges. The federal 
government originally provided up to $3.8 billion in start-up loans to create these co-op 
entities, and existing health insurance companies, state and local governments were 
prohibited from establishing such a co-op (Giaimo, 2013). Literature discusses the history 
of these cooperative ventures (Grey, 2009), and provides a case study analysis of one 
Wisconsin cooperative (Giaimo, 2013). Outside of academic literature, much debate has 
occurred regarding the potential value of these co-ops (Pear & Harris, 2009), and 
potential pitfalls that would make them ineffective (Hilzenrath & MacGillis, 2009). 
Opportunities exist for quantitative study of the effectiveness of the cooperative entities, 
their impact on publicly traded health insurers, and further case study analysis of their 
performance as their first year of operations within exchanges in 2014 ended. However, 
the limited information available indicates that these traditional insurer alternatives might 
have been viewed as posing a strategic threat and thus impacted the share prices of 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  36 
 
 
 
publicly traded insurers, particularly given their initial government funding. These co-op 
entities are subject to MLR reporting requirements and rebates (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2015). More recent history has shown that these co-ops have proved 
unsuccessful, as through July 2016 only a third of them are still operating (Meyer, 2016). 
This is due in part to the challenges inherently facing smaller carriers as they compete 
against larger, more established rival competitors (Hayes, 2016); however, at the onset of 
the ACA these future difficulties may have not been as well appreciated.  
 
The Use of Medical Loss Ratio Calculations 
 The introduction of a consistent, nation-wide MLR requirement has a direct 
impact on insurers effective January 1, 2011 and has been a much-discussed component 
of the ACA-related literature. An insurer’s Medical Loss Ratio reflects how much of 
premium revenue is spent on paying healthcare claims of the plan’s enrollees or spent on 
certain allowable expenses such as fraud reduction. For example, a MLR requirement of 
85%, such as that used for large commercial plans, would require that claims and 
allowable expenses must be no less than 85% of premiums on a rolling three year 
average; anything less than that limit must be refunded to policyholders. This effectively 
limits the profitability of insurers.  
 The ramifications of issuing premium rebates to policyholders must not be 
underestimated. The administrative effort, as well as the potential confusion of 
policyholders and the negative implications of rebates (i.e., overcharging of premiums), 
are all challenging outcomes of rebates. However, for a for-profit insurer, rebates also 
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mean that money is not available to shareholders in the form of dividends or other return 
on investment.   
 There is debate within the healthcare academic community as to whether the 
MLR is an effective tool to use to analyze and evaluate insurance company performance: 
Robinson (1997) states, “Some view a low medical loss ratio as an indicator of health 
plan efficiency, solvency, and creditworthiness. Others denounce a low ratio as proof of 
quality shading, risk skimming, and profit mongering” (p. 176). Thus, Robinson clearly 
articulates the mixed reaction to MLR results, which alternatively may be perceived as 
positive or negative by markets. Karaca-Mandic, Abraham, & Simon (2015) refer to the 
use of MLR regulation as demonstrating a “presumed market failure [of] insurer market 
power as reflected by excessive profits” (p. 56), which is corrected via the issuance of 
policyholder rebates. This viewpoint is supported by their analysis of 2001 – 2009 insurer 
data, which demonstrates that in areas with one significant insurer competing in the 
marketplace, those insurers with monopoly power have lower MLRs. 
Robinson (1997) also provides an example of instances in which organizational 
structure and the level of integration significantly impact ratio results. Given the 
differences between HMO entities and traditional network insurers, which both must 
measure and report MLR results, this represents a very real risk of legal structure and cost 
accounting driving different ratio calculations. In Turnbull & Kane’s 1999 evaluation of 
the accounting and actuarial methods of five HMO organizations, they found significant 
differences among organizations; when standardized, these differences would have 
reduced MLR’s between 0.2% and 4.4% - a level that would potentially impact MLR 
rebate payments had the ACA been in effect. 
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Changes Associated with Medical Loss Ratios 
Comparison of pre-ACA state MLRs, which differed between jurisdictions, 
generally found that states that had MLR’s were much less restrictive than the new 
federal MLR; these ranged from 60 – 75% at the state level in comparison to the federal 
level of 80 – 85%. The federal ratio calculation provides for the inclusion of quality 
improvement expenditure activities as well as taxes and fees within the calculation, while 
state MLRs typically do not (Harrington, 2013). States also may differ in the definition of 
a small group versus large group that is used to categorize MLR calculations, although 
these must be standardized to the federal MLR criteria by 2016 (Fontenot, 2014).   
Outside of comparisons of the historical state MLR requirements to the new 
federal requirements, much conjecture has occurred within literature as to its eventual 
consequences for insurers. Harrington (2013) stated that the new MLR requirements will 
result in consolidation and market concentration, as insurers’ profits are limited and the 
inherent statistical volatility of claims experience makes it difficult for them to accurately 
forecast premium needs. Using National Health Expenditure data, Harrington calculated 
the MLRs for not-for-profit and for-profit insurers for the years 1965 – 2010, finding that 
on average, insurers’ MLR ratios were 87.7%. In some years the average dropped well 
below 85%, while in others it was in excess of 90%. This volatility demonstrates the 
challenges that insurers will face in maintaining a consistent MLR in line with federal 
requirements while maintaining sufficient reserves to weather high claim years. 
Similarly, Abraham and Karaca-Mandic (2011) evaluated 2009 financial data and 
estimated that 29% of insurers would have a MLR in at least one line of business fall 
below the established thresholds and be potentially subject to rebates. This estimated 
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impact was predicted to be largest in nine specific states, representing areas of the 
country in which insurance company profits were the largest.  Ungar (2011b) predicted,  
The medical loss ratio will, ultimately, lead to the death of large parts of the 
private, for-profit health insurance industry. Why? Because there is absolutely no 
way for-profit health insurers are going be able to learn how to get by and still 
make a profit while being forced to spend at least 80 percent of their receipts 
providing their customers with the coverage for which they paid. 
 McCue, Hall, and Xinliang (2013) evaluated the changes arising between 2010 
and 2011 in insurers’ key financial ratios to identify the impact of the federal MLR 
requirements that went into effect January 1, 2011. The authors found that the most 
significant changes occurred in the individual market by for-profit insurers, where the 
companies increased their MLR by 7%, primarily through decreased administrative costs. 
These results were confirmed by Abraham, Karaca-Mandc, & Simon (2014) who 
performed an analysis over the same 2010 – 2011 period with similar results. McCue & 
Hall (2015) then analyzed the 2011 – 2012 period, noting that MLR rates continued to 
rise in the second year of the ACA’s requirements, with for-profit companies reporting 
the highest rates of increase. 
The premium rebate results for each year are also closely watched, with $1.1 
billion, $504 million, and $332 million in rebate checks issued in 2011, 2012, and 2013, 
respectively (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014b), with analysis and 
reporting on the large payers occurring in popular media (Herman, 2014).  Despite the 
significant number of individuals receiving rebate checks (6.8 million Americans in 
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2013, according to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014b), there 
remains a lack of understanding about the MLR and its role within the ACA. The Kaiser 
Family Foundation (2012) found that only 37% and 35% of Americans surveyed in 2010 
and 2012, respectively, recognize the medical loss ratio as a component of the ACA.  
Relatively little attention has been devoted to understanding the securities market 
responses to ACA provisions. Research performed by Day, Himmelstein, Broder, & 
Woolhander (2015) represents perhaps the closest attempt at evaluating factors outside of 
MLR calculations; their analysis reviewed publicly traded health insurers’ administrative 
cost activity and SEC filings for the three years prior to the ACA and the three years 
subsequent to the ACA, concluding there were no significant changes in loss ratios 
between the periods analyzed. These results are inconsistent with those reported by 
Abraham et al.  (2014) and McCue et al. (2013), due potentially to the differences in the 
periods analyzed and the specific companies selected for analysis.  
 
Constitutionality of Medical Loss Ratios 
 Within legal academic literature, there is a discussion and debate as to the 
constitutionality of the MLR thresholds (Epstein & Stannard, 2012). The authors accuse 
the ACA, through establishment of MLR’s, turning insurers into de facto public utilities. 
If true, the Act would represent an unconstitutional taking. Dissenting researchers contest 
this viewpoint and state that there are important differences between public utilities and 
insurers through the lens of the ACA, such as public utilities’ monopoly power (Cordner, 
2015).  Regardless of one’s position on the constitutionality of the ACA, Epstein & 
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Stannard’s arguments represent the level of general dissension and discussion regarding 
the ACA and the MLR in particular. 
 
Summary - Literature Related to the ACA 
A significant amount of historical analysis has been conducted on the differences 
between for-profit and not-for-profit healthcare entities. These discussions have been 
highlighted by changes resulting from the ACA that impact both for-profit and not-for-
profit organizations, in potentially different ways. In summary, literature has compared 
the federal and state MLR’s, predicted the outcome of the MLR requirements and its 
impacts on insurers, and evaluated its actual implications in financial performance for 
those companies, as well as highlighted a lack of understanding by the general public of 
these significant ACA developments. Literature has also evaluated the MLR calculations 
immediately prior to and following the ACA. Conspicuously absent from the MLR 
discussion is the evaluation of market response to these developments for for-profit 
insurers.  
 
Efficient Market Hypothesis 
With the previously discussed insurance industry and regulatory considerations in 
mind, it is appropriate to next move to the topic of financial markets, and how markets 
incorporate and react to information. Specifically, the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) addresses the extent to which share prices reflect information. Event studies at 
their very core are tests of market efficiency, evaluating the impact of information, the 
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speed at which the information is absorbed into share prices, and the level of bias of the 
market reaction (Kothari, 2001). Thus, an overview of the literature regarding market 
efficiency is in order. This section will summarize EMH, as well as the separate but 
related Random Walk Theory (RWT). This discussion will also briefly address the Chaos 
and Noise Theories. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis is largely credited to Fama (1970), who was 
awarded the 2013 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his contributions to the study 
of asset pricing. As stated previously, EMH addresses the level to which share prices 
fully reflect information – whether that information is publicly or privately available. 
Fama introduces three categories of market efficiency. The weak form category assumes 
that current share prices reflect only past events and information; the semi-strong 
category assumes that share prices reflect only publicly available information, and the 
strong form category assumes that share prices reflect all information, public and private 
(Fama, 1970). These categories address the overall informational efficiency of the 
market, assuming that the market “rapidly, if not instantaneously, digests all information 
as it becomes available” (Fama, 1970, p. 388) within the confines of each categories’ 
definition. Stated another way, Malkiel (2003) defines market efficiency simply as 
markets in which investors cannot earn above-average returns without accompanying 
above-average risks. Alternatively, efficient markets are described as being rational, 
reflecting a fair game, and unbeatable (Statman, 2011).  
Fama (1970) recognized that the weak and strong form categories are largely 
conceptual in nature and the semi-strong form category is most likely to be found in real-
world markets. The underlying hypothesis of this study is based on this foundation: that 
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the financial markets reflected only the publicly available information prior to the release 
of information arising from the regulatory or legislative process. As a result, with the 
release of new information, financial markets react, and if the information is deemed 
relevant and to effect the public company insurers, share prices will adjust.  
Beaver (1998), as summarized by Nichols & Wahlen (2004), provides three 
theoretical links between earnings and share prices that explain how the EMH 
incorporates earning information to set share prices: “1. current period earnings provides 
information to predict future periods’ earnings, which 2. provide information to develop 
expectations about dividends in future periods, which 3. provide information to determine 
share value” (Nichols & Wahlen, 2004, p. 263). Thus, stock prices are simply the result 
of information flows (Ball & Brown, 2014). In this manner, there are many similarities 
between the incorporation of earnings information into share prices and the incorporation 
of public announcements into share prices – both represent information that must be 
digested by market participants, and decisions made on the basis of that information.  
 
A “Mountain of Presumptions” 
Given the nature of market theory and the challenges posed by creating an 
appropriate environment for testing, Findlay & Williams (2000) state that, “the entire 
chain of logic supporting the efficient market position has always been based on a 
mountain of presumptions” (p. 181). The EMH is conceptually supported by a frictionless 
market – one in which there are no transaction costs for security trades, there is no cost to 
market participants to obtain information, and all individuals agree on the implications of 
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current information (Fama, 1970). However, these conditions are not easily replicated in 
a real-world market and thus concessions must be made in order to test EMH. This 
includes the revision of the criteria regarding the cost of obtaining information; Jensen 
(1978) revises this criteria to state that prices will reflect information as long as the 
marginal benefits of acting on information outweigh the marginal costs. The challenge in 
creating an environment to test the EMH is also reflected in the joint hypothesis problem: 
“Some model of market equilibrium, however simple, is required. This is the rub in tests 
of market efficiency. Any test is simultaneously a test of efficiency and of assumptions 
about the characteristics of market equilibrium.” (Fama, 1976, p. 137) These challenges 
result in the need to thoughtfully craft an event study calculation, and are applicable in 
the case of this research as well. Factors such as confounding variables, endogeneity, and 
cross-sectional dependence will be discussed in conjunction with the method in Chapter 
3. 
Another important underlying assumption of EMH is that participants in the 
market are rational spectators, a concept introduced by Milton Friedman (1953). A 
rational market participant will purchase shares when they are viewed as too low, and sell 
when they are perceived as too high. This shared “buy low, sell high” philosophy for all 
market participants will allow the true price of shares to emerge through a series of 
transactions. This process, also termed price convergence or price discovery, is one 
aspect of market theory that has led to criticism of EMH, which will be discussed in a 
further section. While an understanding of the assumptions related to market participants 
is relevant, it is important to note that the reactions of participants are not necessarily 
reflective of the true impact of that information; this is consistent with the findings of 
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Reynolds (2008) in her analysis of the impact of anti-dumping laws. The intent of this 
study is to understand how market participants react, whether they are in fact rational or 
irrational, and regardless of whether their interpretation of new information is accurate or 
inaccurate.  
 
Without Judgments 
EMH does not make underlying judgments about whether share prices are “right” 
or “wrong”, as the accuracy of share prices is addressed through the concept of 
fundamental efficiency. Fundamental efficiency refers to the question of whether 
competitive financial markets produce the correct price for investors, which may 
represent the present value of discounted future cash flows (Gilson & Kraakman, 2014). 
Markets may be efficient even if errors in share price valuation occur, if market 
participants are irrational, or if share prices are volatile: “As long as stock markets exist, 
the collective judgment of investors will sometimes make mistakes” (Malkiel, 2003, p. 
80). Prices may thus reflect a bubble or in fact reflect an under-valuation of a company’s 
assets and future prospects. Additionally, EMH does not address whether the market’s 
reaction to information is of a “correct” magnitude or even directionally accurate: Fama 
(1998) found that investors were equally likely to underreact to information as they were 
to overreact, as evidenced by reversals in share prices after a triggering event. This 
tendency, termed “post earnings announcement drift” has also been identified by other 
researchers, including Ball and Brown (1968). As discussed further in Chapter 3, the 
event study methodology requires the selection of an event window, reflecting dates 
surrounding a triggering event that are used to measure and evaluate share price changes 
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associated with the release of information. To the extent that post event announcement 
drift occurs within this window, this study will incorporate this phenomenon. However, 
the intention of this study is not to examine the occurrence of a post event announcement 
drift. 
Gilson and Kraakman (2014) argue that in real world markets, it is impossible to 
measure fundamental efficiency (i.e., the ability to receive the “correct” price) but that 
increasing the informational efficiency of markets will ultimately increase the overall 
fundamental efficiency as well. As the natural interconnectedness of financial markets 
increases, due to factors such as global trade, higher levels of sophistication in financial 
instruments, and economic strategies of sovereign nations, it is evident that informational 
efficiency is an important component of share valuation (International Monetary Fund, 
2010). Research relating to the financial crisis of 2008 has attributed the lack of 
fundamental efficiency in share prices (errors in security valuation) to data gaps that 
represent an absence of informational efficiency (Gehrig & Haas, 2014; International 
Monetary Fund, 2010). 
The intention of this study is not to assess the fundamental efficiency of the share 
prices of publicly traded health insurers, as discussed in the Limitations section. This is 
due in part to the inherent challenges in measuring fundamental efficiency in the context 
of evolving legislation and regulation, as well as the unique contextual assessment of 
information for each insurer. There even remains argument about what defines 
fundamental value; while Campbell and Shiller (1988) find that a company’s earnings act 
as a natural proxy for their share’s fundamental value, the present value of expected 
future dividends may also be used to define share price (Feltham & Oholson, 1999; 
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Zhang, 2000). Changes in share prices are thus assumed to reflect changes in future 
dividend distributions. With the debate about defining fundamental value, challenges in 
measuring fundamental efficiency, and lack of clarity about what the “right” answer is for 
the interpretation of share prices, this study will focus on understanding rather than 
judging the accuracy of market participants’ reactions to information associated with the 
ACA and the MLR. 
 
Evidence from Market Efficiency Tests 
The landmark Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) studies, based to a large 
extent on EMH and event study methodology, allowed researchers to understand the 
impact of the announcement of annual earnings on share prices. These findings have 
upheld the concept of EMH, as the majority of information content in earnings releases 
are anticipated by the financial markets before their release (Ball & Brown, 1968; 
Beaver, 1968).  
Research has also evaluated the extent to which the EMH facilitates the 
consideration of competitor companies’ earnings announcement into overall share 
performance for that industry. Firth (1976) demonstrates that earning announcements are 
efficiently absorbed into close competitor share prices as surrogates for the performance 
of those companies. This reveals that the form of information leading to changes within 
share prices through an efficient market may vary widely; from publicly available 
competitor price information, to private information provided in investor meetings that is 
apparently leaked and reflected in share prices (Rose, 2003). This supports the use of a 
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portfolio of companies within an industry to assess the relationship between changes in 
share prices and an announcement, which is the approach used by this study, as discussed 
further in Chapter 3. 
 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Current Market Events 
Academic literature has widely discussed EMH given the volatility in financial 
markets within the last several decades and the increasing speed of information 
availability. “The ‘information superhighway’, 401(k) investment decisions in the hands 
of average citizens, the widespread availability of online trading, computerized high 
frequency trading, the 24-hour availability of news, and the dependence on a global 
economy have all added information variables… more quasi-rational investors have 
entered the financial decision-making arena” (Bell, 2012, p. 55). These changes are so 
potentially significant that recent researchers have questioned whether the underlying 
concepts of the EMH still hold true. In particular, the velocity and quality of information 
has increased significantly and been the subject of articles, as follows. 
 Drake, Guest, and Twedt (2014) evaluated approximately 111,000 earnings-
related business press articles between 2000 and 2010, finding that the increased levels of 
information dissemination by the media have increased the market’s ability to reflect data 
within share prices via increased likelihood to accurately reflect events within share 
prices. Similarly, Bertone, Paeglis, and Ravi (2015) evaluated volatility in share prices 
between 1998 and 2010 (comparing share prices of companies within the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average and its index fund), noting a significant increase in operational market 
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efficiency, consistent with the strong or semi-strong forms of market efficiency. The 
increased levels of information availability and the ability of researchers and analysts to 
use share price data to perform mathematical modeling and utilize technological tools 
also means that any information available on apparent price variations or market 
opportunities are quickly exploited, and thus absorbed into share prices and eliminated as 
aprofitable investing strategy (Malkiel, 2003). Examples of these publicized and 
exploited pricing gaps include low Monday returns (Cross, 1973, French, 1980; Gibbons 
& Hess, 1981), as well as increased prices the day preceding a holiday (Ariel, 1990). The 
information dissemination and the response of the markets to these seasonal variations 
supports EMH. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the financial markets would also react 
to information associated with the ACA and MLR. 
Bell (2012) provides some additional perspective regarding the impact on 
financial markets from the increase in the velocity of information, describing the current 
environment as being “informationally hyperefficient” and leading to increased volatility 
in share prices. As information develops second by second, and investors react to each 
new piece of information, share prices are more likely to fluctuate rapidly. Challenges 
regarding information reliability (given the increase in data sources), volume (from trades 
driven by computer algorithms and high frequency trading), and distortion may occur in 
an efficient market and increase market volatility.  
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Random Walk Theory 
Closely related to the weak form of EMH is the Random Walk Theory (RWT). 
The RWT expands the concept of share prices reflecting all historical events to assert that 
future price changes will be unrelated to current pricing or historical events. Described 
another way, the “stock market has no memory” (Malkiel, 2003, p. 61). This concept, 
articulated in market theory publications in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Cootner, 1964), has 
been largely rejected through more recent tests (Lo & MacKinlay, 1999; Lo, Mamaysky 
& Wang, 2000). However, Bradshaw, Drake, Myers & Myers (2012) have found that the 
RWT is more accurate than market analysts in many cases, particularly over longer time 
horizons, for companies of a smaller size and with a shorter history. Despite these 
situation-specific instances in which the RWT is upheld, recent literature has 
demonstrated that the RWT is generally inconsistent with actual market activity and stock 
performance (Lo & MacKinlay, 1999; Lo et al., 2000). Thus, the rejection of the RWT 
rejects the weak form of theoretical market efficiency and supports this study’s 
theoretical underpinnings of semi-strong market efficiency. 
 
Alternatives to the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
EMH is not without its critics. These criticisms have led to the development of 
alternative or complementary theories about how markets function and how market 
participants interact. One key discussion point relates to the issue of incentives and the 
apparent discrepancy between the current infrastructure supporting financial market 
activity and EMH. For example, Grossman and  Stiglitz (1980) recognize that if strong 
form EMH does exist and prices already reflect information, there is no incentive for 
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market participants to acquire new information as it is already reflected in prices – i.e., a 
trader would have no incentive to read through House or Senate Committee drafts to 
educate him or herself on upcoming regulatory changes for insurers. This would also 
prevent any trader from having a long-term informational advantage. Additionally, with 
the combination of RWT and EMH, no trader would benefit from performing technical 
analysis, in which past share prices are analyzed to predict future share prices (Malkiel, 
2003). This is clearly inconsistent with the fact that significant effort continues to be 
invested by analysts and others in these efforts, which causes one to conclude that some 
degree of market inefficiency must remain (Gilson & Kraakman, 2014).  
The existence of irrational investors, and the attempts of rational investors to price 
arbitrage the results of irrational investors’ actions, may explain the financial market 
infrastructure. Shiller (1984), a co-recipient of the 2013 Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Science for his work on asset pricing, addressed the topic of irrational 
investors. A fundamental theory underlying EMH is that market participants are rational 
in nature, seeking to “buy low, sell high”. The field of behavioral finance addresses 
whether this theory of rationality holds true, and Shiller was a pioneer in this field. Shiller 
(1984) argues that subjective views of investors translate to trading activities that do not 
necessarily relate to the true fundamental value of stocks. This results in extended waves 
of irrational optimism (creating bubbles) or pessimism (creating recessions or 
depressions) that differ from the prices that would result if all investors were rational. 
These market theories are upheld by the work of Kogan et al. (2006), who demonstrated 
that even if they are relatively small market participants, irrational investors may 
significantly impact market prices. As stated by Lee (2001), “the best evidence in favor 
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of the long-term viability of noise traders [irrational investors] is the continued existence 
of active professional arbitrageurs” (p. 238). 
These concepts have been formalized into what is termed Noise Theory, as 
economists use the term “noise” to describe irrational behavior that interferes with market 
efficiency. Noise theory does not seek to explain why the irrational behavior, or noise, is 
occurring, but rather evaluates the overall market impact of those behaviors. Market 
prices thus arise from a complex process that combines the actions of rational and 
irrational investors, incorporating information from a variety of sources, and frequently 
results in price deviation from true fundamental value. Noise trading is used to explain 
high levels of trading volumes, the existence of professional investment advisors, and 
deviations from fundamental value that occur in instances such as bubbles (Lee, 2001). 
The concept of Noise Theory is relevant to this study in that it specifically recognizes and 
accepts the fact that the share prices are the result of a combination of factors, both 
rational and irrational. Thus, when share prices are evaluated in light of events associated 
with the Affordable Care Act, the market reaction is not reflecting only the actions of 
rational investors, making thoughtful and reasoned decisions in response to information. 
When considering political events, such as the election of President Obama, this is 
particularly relevant, as political biases may color the responses of market participants. 
Components of the ACA, such as the MLR, thus are assessed by individuals with varying 
levels of expertise in healthcare regulations and may react rationally or irrationally. 
Somewhat related to Noise Theory is that of Chaos Theory, which also is based 
on the premise that prices are determined through a nonlinear process. However, in the 
case of Chaos Theory, share prices are viewed as arising from hidden patterns that 
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actually demonstrate a sense of order, and may be predicted if the underlying patterns are 
identified (Cunningham, 1994). This differs from the RWT in that under Chaos Theory, 
there is a pattern but users are not able to understand it; in RWT, there is no pattern. 
These underlying and complex patterns that support market activity may result from 
rational or irrational behavior, or a combination thereof. For the purpose of this study, 
Chaos Theory may reflect the researchers’ inability to identify patterns or commonalities 
of data within study results. Thus, there may be unseen patterns within the share price 
fluctuations, such as a “no effect” result in calculations, that are driven by specific 
factors. 
 
Summary – Literature Related to the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In summary, there exists a significant amount of research that attempts to explain 
and demonstrate how markets react to information, and how market participants interact 
with information and with one another. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has 
generally been upheld through event and association studies. Share prices are seen as a 
product of information and actions by rational investors, and under Noise Theory, also 
reflect the actions of irrational investors that may have a disproportional impact on share 
prices. Event studies seek to understand and explain the impact of information on share 
prices, and viewing those share prices as an outcome of information reflects an important 
underlying theory.   
The weak form of market efficiency and the Random Walk Theory has largely 
been rejected, and the strong form of market efficiency is viewed as largely theoretical 
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(Fama, 1970). This study assumes the semi-strong form of market efficiency, and the 
event study methodology used reflects these underlying assumptions. Testing of the 
EMH, as discussed previously, does require a “mountain of presumptions” (Findlay & 
Williams, 2000) to link market theory to testable scenarios. Event study methodology 
does not intend to measure fundamental market efficiency, or identification of the “right” 
share price; it simply seeks to understand how market participants respond and react to 
information and reflect it in share prices. While frequently the event study methodology 
and EMH has been assessed using accounting data, such as the release of earnings 
information or dividend transactions, it is also used for other types of information 
announcements, which will be discussed further in Chapter 3. In particular, an 
understanding of how markets incorporate information into share prices forms an 
important foundation for appropriate use of the event study method to assess reactions to 
the ACA. 
 
Healthcare Organizations and Financial Markets 
 With an understanding of the ACA and financial markets, we can now move to an 
intersection of the two fields of study, investigating previous research. This includes 
studies of historical legislative and regulatory developments and their relationship to 
share prices and financial performance for healthcare companies, as well as 
understanding the information valued by financial markets in their evaluation of 
healthcare organizations.  
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Previous Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
The healthcare industry is highly regulated (Khansa, Cook, James & Bruyaka, 
2012) and there are thus many previous regulatory and legislative actions throughout the 
last several decades that researchers have evaluated to understand their financial 
implications. Most recently, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) introduced specific requirements related to protection of patient data, with the 
intention of reducing fraud and abuse. The nature of these requirements necessitated the 
investment in information technology and security infrastructure by healthcare 
organizations (Kilbridge, 2003). Khansa et al. used event study methodology to evaluate 
the impact of the legislative HIPAA developments on the share prices of healthcare, 
information security, and information technology firms, finding that there was a negative 
relationship to changes in share prices for firms in the healthcare industry but a negative 
relationship to the share prices of information technology and security companies. The 
authors recognized that the long-term effects of HIPAA may serve to reduce operating 
costs and be a positive outcome for healthcare organizations, but the fear and uncertainty 
regarding the initial costs of compliance were a potential driver of the decrease in share 
prices. This result may be analogized to the ACA; while long-term effects may be 
positive, uncertainty in the financial markets may result in temporary or initial share price 
volatility.  
 Prior to the introduction of HIPAA legislation, the Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) was introduced by the federal government in 1983 to create a new method of 
compensating hospitals for Medicare inpatient services. This new payment methodology 
provided incentives for hospitals to increase efficiency by paying a fixed rate for 
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diagnoses (Jacobson, 1994). Changes in the economic incentives for hospitals in this 
significant market segment served to increase systemic risk for publicly traded hospitals 
(Asper & Hassan, 1993). This was in contrast to the market response as reflected in share 
prices. Folland and Kleiman (1990) and Jacobson (1994) used event study methodology 
to evaluate the impact of PPS on the share prices of publicly traded hospitals, finding that 
the financial markets did not decisively respond to the new legislation, either positively 
or negatively. Jacobson (1994) concluded that investors “correctly anticipated the 
ineffectiveness” (p. 450) of the bill.  
 Topping, Carroll and Lindley (1997) also examined the PPS legislation from a 
broader perspective, with an overall objective of understanding the impact on hospitals’ 
capital acquisition practices. They found that changes introduced by PPS caused hospital 
margins to decrease, which depressed bond ratings and increased the borrowing costs for 
hospitals and increased the rate of defaults. These factors combined to delay investment 
in infrastructure by hospital entities. The different methodologies and approaches used by 
these researchers to assess the impact of legislative developments on healthcare 
organizations can inform studies of current events. The different results of the Topping et 
al. (1997) and Jacobson (1994) studies are also of note: while the legislation had little 
impact on near-term share prices, in the longer time horizon it did impact hospitals’ 
borrowing costs. 
 Perhaps the most recent and relevant analysis of market events and the ACA is the 
research conducted by Borochin and Golec (2016). Their analysis of two events relating 
to the ACA, including the House passage of the Act and the Supreme Court decision 
upholding the constitutionality of the ACA, was done through a modified event study. 
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Since they examined stock option pricing rather than share price fluctuations themselves, 
their findings are not directly indicative of what one should expect from this research, but 
may be directionally accurate. The authors found that pharmaceutical stocks experienced 
little reaction to the passage of the Act, while hospital shares experienced significant 
positive abnormal returns. 
 
Interconnectedness of Healthcare Industry Participants 
 The results of the Khansa et al. HIPAA study reflect the strong links within the 
healthcare industry between buyers and suppliers. This is echoed by the results of 
analysis by Ewing, Kruse, and Thompson (2008), who found strong correlations between 
changes in share prices of payers (insurance companies) and product suppliers (firms 
providing medical goods such as pharmaceuticals, durable medical equipment, etc.). 
They found similarly strong relationships between payers and providers (such as 
hospitals and physician groups). This demonstrates the natural interconnectedness of 
firms operating within the same industry, and highlights the risk of confounding variables 
when conducting event studies that relate to the healthcare industry.  
Like other industries (Engle & Ng, 1993), healthcare industry stocks prove to be 
more volatile and responsive to negative unexpected events than positive unexpected 
events (Ewing, Kruse, & Thompson, 2005). Perhaps unsurprisingly, there were important 
differences in market reactions to events impacting healthcare service providers, product 
suppliers, and payers based on the individual nature of the industry sub-sector. Physical 
capital requirements, market alternatives, and the varying levels of price and cost 
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pressure all served to create nuances in share price fluctuations among healthcare 
industry participants. Thus, while there are important linkages between market 
participants in the healthcare sector, there are also significant differences in how the 
market responses to new information.  
 
Information Valued by Financial Markets 
Research has shown that nonfinancial data is highly valued by financial markets 
as they assess healthcare organizations’ prospects (Watkins, 2000). Studies have also 
shown that this nonfinancial data is under-represented in traditional corporate financial 
reporting content for healthcare organizations (Chu, Zollinger, Kelly & Saywell, 1991; 
Sherman, 1986). Additional research has identified specific nonfinancial metrics that may 
prove valuable: Craycraft (1994) highlighted the importance of socioeconomic variables 
such as population age, growth, and prevalence of Medicaid patients, during the 
assessment of a hospital’s financial performance. Similarly, Lawrence and Kurtenbach 
(1995) discussed the importance of operational factors such as number of births, 
operations, and case mix (an indicator of the severity of health issues). These 
nonfinancial metrics are more frequently reported for public companies given their 
reporting requirements under the Securities and Exchange Commission through the 
inclusion of Management Discussion and Analysis. In the case of non-public 
organizations, particularly those who participate in the municipal bond market, these 
typically present a reporting gap (Watkins & Brenner, 2003). Case mix of admissions in 
particular was found to be important in assessing bond ratings (Watkins & Brenner, 
2003). Accordingly, analysts are increasingly demanding non-financial data to inform 
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their recommendations on public company share prices and bond ratings (Bukh & 
Nielsen, 2010). Qualitative discussions and information on ACA-related metrics within 
financial disclosures for publicly traded health insurers could thus prove valuable for 
individuals attempting to understand the impact of the Act on organizations. 
 
Relevance of Financial Markets for Healthcare Organizations 
As the healthcare industry increasingly adopts capitation payments for hospitals 
(Deloitte & Touche, 2000), similar to the PPS legislation discussed previously, financial 
risk transfers from the insurance payers to the providers (Conrad & Shortell, 1996). 
Hospital financial compensation is held flat, placing increasing pressure for them to 
develop cost efficiency while maintaining high levels of quality. This is also the case for 
HMO’s or integrated care organizations, where established insurance premiums provide 
the primary funding for the cost of care delivery. These relationships enhance the risk 
interconnectedness explored by Ewing, Kruse, & Thompson (2008) between the payer 
and provider sectors, blurring the lines between the nature of the payer and the providers.  
The transition towards managed care organizations is also encouraged through the 
ACA’s incorporation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACO’s), which provides a 
structure for physicians, hospitals and other care providers to deliver care in an integrated 
fashion (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2016). This increases the need for 
insurers to access sources of capital for infrastructure for care delivery purposes. Gray 
(1993) noted that as a result of these industry shifts, financial markets highly valued 
organizations with sufficient access to capital. The need to access to capital, whether 
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through the bond markets or issuance of shares, increases the healthcare industry’s 
dependence on the financial markets (Topping, Caroll, & Lindley, 1997). This was 
particularly evident during the financial market fluctuations in the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s: Reiter, Wheeler and Smith (2008) found that healthcare organizations dependent 
on debt financing (in particular, not-for-profit hospitals) were impacted by market 
liquidity restraints, leading to an under-investment in healthcare infrastructure. 
Reviewing this stream of literature leads one to conclude that a variety of types of 
healthcare organizations (payers and providers) now need to develop care delivery 
infrastructure, and access to capital through the financial markets is a critical component 
of enabling organizations to make this investment. 
 
Summary – Literature Related to Healthcare Organizations and Financial Markets 
Previous research relating to healthcare organizations and financial markets has 
evaluated the impact on share prices of specific regulatory and legislative events such as 
HIPAA (Khansa et al., 2012) and the PPS (Folland & Kleiman, 1990; Jacobson, 1994) in 
a similar manner as planned within this study. Literature also has highlighted the 
interconnected nature of industry participants such as providers, payers, and suppliers 
(Ewing et al., 2008), which is increasingly true with new structures introduced by the 
ACA such as Accountable Care Organizations. In understanding the relationship between 
healthcare organizations and the financial markets, it is clear that the need to access 
capital makes healthcare organizations increasingly reliant on the opinions of market 
participants (Reiter, Wheeler & Smith, 2008; Topping et al., 1997). The literature 
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reviewed in this section support not only the nature and planned methodology of this 
study, but also demonstrates the relevance and importance of its results. 
 
Chapter 2 Overview 
 Chapter 2, comprising a literature review of topics relevant to the study of the 
ACA and market theory, as well as the interconnectedness of healthcare organizations 
and financial markets, provides a background for the data components analyzed within 
this report. Through the literature review, it is apparent that while there is a significant 
amount of popular press discussion about the ACA and its implications for publicly 
traded health insurers, there is relatively little academic study specific to this area. Thus, 
the gaps in the literature support the need for an evaluation of the relationship between 
ACA-related events and changes in the share price of publicly traded health insurers. In 
sum, this study seeks to link the literature and information on the ACA to the underlying 
theories regarding market response, thus evaluating the intersection of the two main 
topics within Chapter 2, and apply these theories to actual market response of events.  
 In Chapter 3, a discussion of the methodology will be incorporated to support the 
selection of a research method to answer these questions. The discussion in Chapter 3 
will also address how companies were selected for analysis, the methods of data 
collection, and the overall approach for evaluation.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 There is a gap in the literature regarding the financial market’s response to the 
ACA for publicly traded health insurers.  Literature does address the business response of 
those insurers to the ACA, unique considerations of for-profit versus not-for-profit 
healthcare organizations, and considerations associated with MLR calculations. However, 
the community of knowledge fails to adequately provide an understanding of how the 
ACA, and the MLR in particular, relates to changes in share prices for publicly traded 
insurers. Given that the ACA was the federal legislation that established the MLR, in 
order to understand market reaction to the MLR it is necessary to examine the response to 
the ACA itself in its various iterations. Examining the MLR through the lens of the 
overall response to the ACA will allow us to understand how the MLR requirements are 
related to changes in share prices. Market reactions to regulatory developments 
associated with the MLR provide a separate view into the perceived importance of the 
ratio.  
Chapter 3 provides contextual information that outlines the research design, 
participant selection, relevant measures and data collection procedures, as well as an 
overview of data analysis. In particular, the chapter explores how the event study method 
has been used in previous studies, supporting its use to answer the research questions 
within this dissertation. This chapter incorporates the results of a pilot study in 
preparation for calculations with a larger sample in Chapter 4.  
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This chapter will establish the methodology used to evaluate the following 
specific hypotheses: 
H1: Cumulative average abnormal price returns (compared to the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index) for public company insurers will be less than 
zero for the period -3 to +3 for legislative events.  
H2:  Cumulative average abnormal price returns (compared to the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index) for public company insurers will be less than 
zero for the period -3 to +3 for regulatory events. 
 
Section 1: Research Design & Rationale 
The event study method is an approach to evaluating changes in stock prices that 
occur around specific events. In a meta-analysis focused on the use of event studies in the 
fields of finance and accounting, Kothari and Warner (2005) summarized articles relating 
to event studies from 1974 to 2000, identifying 565 articles that utilized event study 
methodology to identify and assess abnormal share price activity. The event study 
method is also used to evaluate activity unrelated to finance and accounting; for example, 
sports event sponsorship announcements (Kudo, Yong Jae, Walker, & Connaughton, 
2015), information technology security breaches (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 
2003), and turnover within the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position (Bloom, 2012). 
Within the healthcare industry, Hwang (2013) considered the relationship between 
clinical trial result announcements and changes in stock prices for pharmaceutical 
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companies, finding that the release of clinical trial results (both positive and negative) 
were significant events. 
The event study method is frequently attributed to an initial 1933 publication by 
Dolley that questioned the use of pure accounting data to assess the capital market’s 
reaction to stock splits, suggesting instead the use of a mathematical method that 
compared the expected returns for a company’s stock to the actual returns experienced. 
The event study method was more fully developed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), and the seminal work in the field is commonly attributed 
to these researchers. The event study method was initially used to assess firm-specific 
events such as mergers and acquisitions and stock dividends or splits. In this manner, 
theories relating to the Efficient Market Hypothesis could be evaluated in light of the 
market’s expectations of the individual firm. 
Use of the event study soon expanded beyond assessing firm-specific financial 
events. In the 1980’s a series of event studies were used to evaluate the impact of 
regulatory events on share prices. For example, Aharony and Swary (1981) evaluated the 
impact of the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act, Smith, Bradley, and Jarrell (1986) 
considered the impact of oil price regulation, and Doyle (1985) evaluated the effect of 
agency rulings on share prices. These studies provide a basis for the use of event study 
methodology in assessing ACA regulatory events. Concerns about the mathematical 
models used in these initial analyses led to further discussion and refinement of the 
standard event study methodology to incorporate specific challenges when applying it in 
a regulatory setting. As discussed by Schwert (1981), in the case of regulatory events the 
market’s reaction is a combination of the assessment of the probability of eventual 
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adoption and implementation, as well as the estimate of the potential impact on financial 
performance. Pastor and Veronesi (2012) refer to these as political uncertainty and 
impact uncertainty, respectively. The combination of these factors lead to complications 
in applying standard event study methodology to regulatory events, and are addressed by 
adaptations of standard event study methodology calculations. These mathematical 
refinements will be incorporated into this study. 
As mentioned previously, challenges assessing changes in share prices for 
regulatory or legislative events include the lack a well-defined announcement given that 
the legislative and administrative processes are time intensive in nature, the likelihood 
that regulatory announcements are anticipated in advance of their official publication 
date, and that they may impact multiple companies within an industry (Binder, 1985). 
Other market events, such as dividend events (Asquith & Muilins, 1983; Charest, 1978), 
stock issuances (Asquith & Muilins, 1986) and redemptions (Dann, 1981) are also found 
to be related to changes in share prices only the extent to which they are unanticipated. 
One recognized challenge of using event study methodology for legislative or regulatory 
announcements is that the information may be anticipated in advance; care must be taken 
in the design of the study to identify and isolate announcement dates. Event study 
methodology has consistently demonstrated that these types of unexpected events appear 
to be incorporated into prices within one day of the announcement (Fama, 1991). In 
particular, earnings surprises appear to be incorporated into share prices within 30 
minutes and the temporary accompanying volatility has subsided within two hours (Lee, 
1992). These timelines and prior studies regarding market reactions are important 
considerations when determining the appropriate event window to use in an event study. 
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Other specific issues, and the solutions presented by various researchers in the 
field, are outlined in Table 3 in the subsequent Measures section. At the time of Binder’s 
1985 analysis of the application of event study methodology to regulatory events, he 
concluded that “event study methodology will be useful only if the researcher can 
identify announcements that contain unanticipated information” (p. 168). However, 
future refinement of the mathematical model as developed by Mulherin (2007) and 
Landin (2001) serve to address certain of the issues identified by Binder (1985). These 
methodological revisions will be incorporated into the measures and data analysis 
planned as outlined in the following sections.  
A step-by-step summary of the event study methodology as applied to regulatory 
events will serve to provide an overview of the method but also guide future discussion in 
this section regarding data analysis. This summary is based on the outline used by Bloom 
(2012) as attributed to Seiler (2004): 
1. Define events and event period. In the case of regulatory events, one must 
consider whether the event was widely anticipated by the markets through 
media coverage or other methods of information dissemination, thus the event 
period must be carefully selected. Events, in the case of this study, represent 
announcements or publications associated with the ACA; while all legislative 
or regulatory in nature, they may result from an agency ruling or 
Congressional action. The event window represents a period of time over 
which share prices will be analyzed; for example, +/- 3 days on each side of 
the day of the event. 
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2. Select the companies for analysis. Considerations in this step include 
validating that entities selected for analysis have readily available share prices 
and are actively traded to ensure sufficient data availability.  
3. Establish expectations of “normal” stock price behavior through selection of 
estimation periods and indices. The objective of this step is to determine the 
basis for the calculation of normal returns. This includes selection of an 
appropriate index or indices, as well as a period prior to the event window that 
will be used for measurement. A separate option when selecting an index is 
whether to use an equally-weighted index or one that is value-weighted to 
reflect the weighting of market capitalization. Canina, Michaely, Thaler, and 
Womack (1998) demonstrate that value-weighted indices (also termed 
capitalization-weighted) are a better representation of portfolios held by 
investors and are statistically preferable.  
With an index or indices selected, the next consideration is to select the 
estimation period. The estimation period serves as the benchmark of time used 
to establish expectations regarding a normal rate of return. As discussed by 
Salinger (1992), errors may occur when the event window and the estimation 
period overlap, and thus careful consideration of dates must be made. When 
using monthly data measurements, studies commonly use five to seven years 
of data to determine the estimation period (Binder, 1998). In the case of daily 
data measurements a 120-day estimation window period is commonly used 
(Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and  Zhou, 2003), although the use of 30, 60, or 90 
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day periods are also utilized. There is no consensus regarding the appropriate 
length of an estimation window (Bloom, 2011). 
4. Calculation of normal and abnormal returns. A regression analysis is 
performed during the estimation window, considering the financial 
performance of the selected index and the specific firm stock performance. 
The coefficients of the regression analysis are used to determine the normal 
return that would occur for the selected stock during the event window. 
Mathematically shown, the calculation of the normal return is as follows: 
 Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit   
          
Where Rit  is the rate of return for Company i for period t 
 αi  is the intercept term   
 βi   is the systematic risk of Company i  
 Rmt is the index return for period t  
 εit  is the error term, assumed to be zero  
 
Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the actual returns 
realized for the specific firm, and the normal returns that were calculated 
assuming the absence of an event. Mathematically shown, individual abnormal 
returns are as follows: 
 AR it = AR it - E (R it )   
             
Where AR it =  Abnormal return for company i in period t 
             
 R it =  Actual return for company i in period t  
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 E(R it) =  Expected return for company i in period t 
 
The difference between the normal and abnormal returns reflects the 
market reaction to the identified event. The absence of an abnormal return 
indicates that the event did not have a positive or negative relationship to changes 
in company share prices. Average abnormal returns can then be calculated to 
assess abnormal returns over a time period, as follows: 
 AAR i =  1 
 
 
  AR it     
    n         
             
Where AAR i =  Average abnormal return for time t  
             
 AR it =  Abnormal return for company i in period t 
             
  n =  Sample size      
  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) can be calculated as the sum of daily 
abnormal returns. This allows an assessment of the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns over the event window. Mathematically shown, this is as follows: 
 CAR i =  CAR t-1 + AR t    
            
Where CAR i =  Cumulative abnormal return at time t  
            
 CAR t-1 =  Cumulative abnormal return at time t - 1 
            
 AR t =  Abnormal return at time t    
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) can then be averaged over the event 
window to calculate a Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR), as 
follows: 
 CAAR i =  CAAR t-1 + AAR t    
            
Where CAAR i =  Cumulative average abnormal return at time t 
            
 CAAR t-1 =  Cumulative average abnormal return at time t - 1 
            
 AAR t =  Average abnormal return at time t  
 
 Brown, Stephan, and Warner (1985) stress that this is only appropriate for short 
event windows given the risk that compounding can result in biased results. 
5. Presentation of results and analysis. Results of the calculations performed in 
step 4 are summarized and assessed for significance. The Patell Z-score is 
typically used to evaluate the statistical significance of the abnormal returns 
(Patell, 1976). Analysis of abnormal returns and levels of significance will 
indicate whether the relationship between the market and identified events, 
and whether such changes were positive or negative. The T test, comparing 
means of two populations, is one measure that will be used to analyze these 
results. The Boehmer Test Statistic (Boehmer, Musumeci, & Poulsen, 1991) 
as well as the Rank Test (Corrado, 1989) and the Sign Test (Cowan, 1992) 
also will be shown.  
In instances of a “no result” finding, it is important to acknowledge that this could 
mean many different things. For example, the market could have not efficiently processed 
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the event information, due to leakage or existing expectations already incorporated into 
share prices. Alternatively, the market could have processed the information and 
concluded that it did not have a material implication on company or industry financial 
prospects. Thus, careful interpretation of “no result” findings must be made. 
The analysis conducted by Pastor and Veronesi (2012) demonstrates that on 
average, policy change announcements will cause share prices to decrease, particularly 
when levels of uncertainty are high. Their findings confirmed that in general, policy 
changes increase share price volatility and strengthen the correlation among share price 
changes. This information will be considered when establishing hypotheses for this study. 
 
Section 2: Participants 
 Critical inputs into the event study calculations as outlined above include the 
selection of events, companies, and indices, as well as the data source for the share prices 
of publicly traded shares and relevant indices. Additionally, within the calculations the 
event window (the period over which a change will be evaluated), and estimation period 
(the period establishing the “normal” benchmark) need to be supported. These are key 
components of calculations, and as discussed by Mulherin (2007), “naïve modeling” in 
these areas may result in inaccurate conclusion. 
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Events.  Events selected for analysis are identified in two primary categories: 
Legislative (associated with either the House or the Senate), or Regulatory. These event 
dates, a summary of the nature of the event, and their category are included in Table 1. 
To select key Legislative events within this study, the legislative history as assembled by 
Cannan (2013) will be used. In addition to the legislative actions, various agencies 
release technical guidance, including the release of interim and final rules on specific 
ACA provisions (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). Dates were 
selected based on the official issuance date of publications by federal agencies; while 
these may be subject to the regulatory “noise”, Doyle (1985) posits that these agency 
rulings are less likely to be anticipated by the securities market than is the case for 
legislative rulings. These were obtained from relevant federal agency publications; for 
example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid’s Center for Consumer Information and 
Insurance Oversight, as well as their Regulations and Guidance Center, and are classified 
as Regulatory events. As discussed in Chapter 2, under the semi-strong form of market 
efficiency, all public information (regardless of source) is represented within share prices. 
Thus, the public source of the data is not important but what is critical is that the 
information was available to market participants.  
Given the nature of the ACA legislative events, many of the identified event dates 
occurred in close proximity to one another. As a result, there is a risk that share price 
fluctuations within the estimation window would already represent average abnormal 
returns and create confounding variables. In order to prevent this from impacting the 
calculations in this study, the approach used by Khansa et al. (2012) was used. Namely, 
“micro events” (as they term individual events associated with their HIPAA study) are 
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eliminated from the calculations if they are within 30 days of another micro event. The 
earliest date is used in each case, ensuring an at-least 30 day window between events 
selected. They state,  
The omission of the micro-events does not imply that we have ignored them. On 
the contrary, because of overlap, it means that these micro-events are already 
accounted for once and thus, including them again would be redundant.  It is 
expected that the estimation period takes into account prior information generated 
from prior… events.  (p. 757) 
Table 1 
Event Dates Selected for Analysis 
Date Category Discussion 
Tuesday, 
November 4, 
2008 
Political President Obama wins the 2008 Presidential 
Election. During the campaign, Obama called for 
universal health care, thus markets had an indication 
that should he be elected, the industry could face 
changes. 
Tuesday, June 
9, 2009 
Legislative - 
Senate 
Two Senate Committees created draft healthcare 
legislation. The Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) was the first 
to produce a draft and it was submitted to the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on this date. 
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The HELP Committee draft included individual 
mandates, state exchanges, subsidies for low income 
individuals and small businesses. Most notably, no 
public option was included in this draft. 
Tuesday, July 
14, 2009 
Legislative - 
House 
House Bill 3200 introduced: America's Affordable 
Health Choices Act of 2009, incorporating many 
aspects of the House Discussion Draft as well as 
new requirements, such as a additional tax on 
wealthy taxpayers to pay for the bill's costs. 
Wednesday, 
September 9, 
2009 
Legislative - 
Senate 
Trailing the release of the Senate HELP Committee 
draft on healthcare legislation, on September 9, 2009 
the first Senate Finance Committee draft was 
produced in the form of a Chairman's Mark by 
Chairman Baucus. 
Tuesday, 
October 13, 
2009 
Legislative - 
Senate 
Finance Committee reported out Senate Bill 1796, 
America's Healthy Future Act. The final provisions 
included individual and employer mandates, 
subsidies for low income individuals, Medicaid 
expansion, and tax credits for employers. Funding 
provisions included a variety of sources, including 
Cadillac plan taxes, limitations on healthcare 
spending accounts, and other fees. This Act did not 
include a public option. 
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Wednesday, 
November 18, 
2009 
Legislative - 
Senate 
The Senate now had two Senate healthcare reform 
bills to evaluate: Senate Bill 1796 (Finance 
Committee) and Senate Bill 1769 (HELP 
Committee), as well as House bill 3962. Rather than 
progress these further, Senate Majority Leader Reid 
produced a proposal that incorporated components 
of each of these bills.  ". Significant funding features 
included Cadillac plan taxes, taxes on elective 
cosmetic surgery, insurance companies, medical 
devices, pharmaceutical companies. This proposal 
included a public option.  Of particular note was the 
requirement of 90% Medical Loss Ratios - 
significantly higher thresholds than subsequent bills. 
The CBO cost estimate on this proposal was 
significantly less than the other three Senate and 
House Bills, but concluded that the 90% MLR 
requirement would "devastate the industry." 
Majority Reid's proposal was issued as Senate 
amendment 2786, to existing House bill 3590. 
House Bll 3590, originally titled the Service 
Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, was 
effectively gutted by Senate Amendment 2786 and 
used as a vehicle for healthcare reform legislation. 
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Saturday, 
December 19, 
2009 
Legislative - 
Senate 
Senate amendment 3276 introduced to House Bill 
3590, to reflect amendments from the Senate floor. 
These included a replacement of cosmetic surgery 
taxes to indoor tanning studio taxes, as well as the 
introduction of requirements for segregation of 
premiums used to cover abortion services, to ensure 
that federal tax subsidies were not used for provision 
of abortions.  
Thursday, 
March 18, 
2010 
Legislative - 
House 
House Rules Committee publishes amendments to 
Senate Bill 3590 in form of House Bill 4872 with 
CBO cost estimates. House Bill 4872 is titled the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010. Significant revisions to the bill include 
increased subsidies, taxes on investment income 
above certain thresholds, and changes to effective 
dates on Cadillac plan taxes. 
Monday, 
November 22, 
2010 
Regulatory In conjunction with the ACA, the Office of 
Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight 
provided estimates and rebate modeling information. 
On November 22, 2010, the agency published the 
Interim Final Rule for Health Insurers Implementing 
Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) Requirements under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (OCIIO-
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9998-IFC), to include data and technical discussion 
regarding the modeling initially provided. With this 
data, industry analysts were better able to assess the 
overall impact on health insurers in aggregate and 
better understand the underlying assumptions made 
by federal agencies when crafting regulations.  
Thursday, 
December 30, 
2010 
Regulatory Given the complexity and volume of the December 
1, 2010 interim final rule, perhaps it was inevitable 
that certain technical errors were included. On 
December 30, 2010, the Health and Human Services 
Department issued a publication to correct technical 
errors in their original interim and final rule 
published on December 1, 2010. These errors 
included typographical errors as well as clarifying 
language (for example, addressing the use of “may” 
and “can”). Further, the December 1, 2010 rule 
failed to properly incorporate the NAIC’s 
recommendation of treatment of fraud recovery 
expenses, which were treated as an allowable 
component of the MLR ratio denominator in a 
manner similar to claims costs. This date was 
selected for analysis as insurers and industry 
analysts would be impacted by these revisions to the 
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original interim and final rule to the extent that it 
adjusted their initial interpretation of the rule and 
estimate of its impact.  
Friday, 
December 2, 
2011 
Regulatory The administrative and operational guidance issued 
in the timeline to this date have primarily focused on 
the insurers’ perspective of calculation of MLR and 
issuance of rebates. However, the treatment of the 
rebates by group health policyholders or sponsors of 
such plans that are covered by the Employment 
Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) had yet to 
be addressed. At question was whether the employer 
(policyholder) receiving the rebate was obligated to 
transfer all or part of the premium rebate to their 
employees. Complications such as termination of 
employee during or subsequent to the coverage 
period also arose. Technical release 2011-04, 
Guidance on Rebates for Group Health Plans Paid 
Pursuant to the Medical Loss Ratio Requirements of 
the Public Health Service Act was released on 
December 2, 2011 by the Department of Labor to 
address such issues. To the extent that the employer 
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group had flexibility in the disposition of their 
rebates, in the event that a rebate occurred it may be 
viewed more favorably by insurers’ customers and 
the financial markets. 
Tuesday, 
January 3, 
2012 
Legislative January 3, 2012, as the first business day of 2012, 
represented an important date of two ACA-related 
items, the first relating to the effective date of the 
December 7, 2011 interim final rule discussed 
previously, as well as the beginning of the 
Accountable Care Organization (ACO) structure. 
Intended to encourage integrated health systems 
where healthcare providers and other key 
constituents such as local healthcare governmental 
agencies form relationships to better manage and 
coordinate Medicare patient care, participants are 
able to financially benefit if certain objectives are 
achieved. Insurers such as Humana, United 
Healthcare, and Cigna elected to participate in 
private ACO’s, with the objective of improving their 
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members’ health and thereby decreasing their 
overall cost structure (Kaiser Health News, 2014). 
Wednesday, 
May 16, 2012 
Regulatory As insurers and agencies began to implement the 
requirements of 45 CFR 158, additional needed 
technical corrections were identified. Accordingly, 
on May 16, 2012 the Department of Health and 
Human Services issued a correcting amendment in 
the form of 77 FR 28788. This technical amendment 
included components such as clarification of the 
definition of a small group for purposes of 
calculating the MLR. Additionally, revisions were 
made to ensure consistency with the NAIC’s 
recommendations on MLR calculations to include 
three months of claims payments subsequent to 
year-end. This publication represents an important 
component of the final MLR regulations. 
Thursday, June 
21, 2012 
Regulatory The Center for Consumer Information and 
Oversight, an arm of CMS, published a report on 
"The 80/20 Rule" outlining the results of the 2011 
MLR filings by insurers and rebate amounts. 
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Friday, 
February 15, 
2013 
Regulatory The Center for Consumer Information and 
Oversight, an arm of CMS, published a report on 
"The 80/20 Rule" outlining the final results of the 
2011 MLR filings by insurers and rebate amounts 
with additional analysis from their June 21, 2012 
publication. 
Thursday, June 
20, 2013 
Regulatory The Center for Consumer Information and 
Oversight, an arm of CMS, published a report on 
"The 80/20 Rule" outlining the final results of the 
2012 MLR filings by insurers and rebate amounts. 
Tuesday, 
January 7, 
2014 
Regulatory The January 7, 2014 final rule issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Services impacts 
a variety of sections of 45 CFR as it addresses ACA 
clarifications. Certain of these revisions specifically 
relate to MLR calculations, but many of these 
modifications apply directly to insurers in other 
ways, such as discussion of insufficiency of 
reinsurance fees collected in relation to reinsurance 
claims submitted. This date was selected as these 
amendments and publications continued to refine 
and revise the implementation and compliance with 
ACA provisions.  
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Thursday, July 
24, 2014 
Regulatory The Center for Consumer Information and 
Oversight, an arm of CMS, published a report on 
"The 80/20 Rule" outlining the final results of the 
2013 MLR filings by insurers and rebate amounts. 
 
Event Window.  As discussed by Binder (1985) and others, one key challenge in 
establishing an event window is that it is unknown when expectations change during the 
course of a regulatory event. Larker, Ormazabel, and Taylor (2011) address this risk in 
their analysis of corporate governance regulation by selecting both the formal 
announcement date as well as the date it appears in the media, finding that in all but one 
case these events are on the same day. An important component of selecting the event 
window is to balance the risk of information “leakage” with the risk that an 
inappropriately broad event window will increase the results of a “no effect” finding 
(Lamdin, 2001). Accordingly, studies have used an event window of the event date +/- 3 
days, comprising a seven day window (Kudo, Yong Jae, Walker, & Connaughton, 2015), 
or simply used daily, weekly, or monthly data, with equal acceptance and use within the 
literature (Lamdin, 2001). Given the quickly moving regulatory timeline for the 
legislative development of the ACA, as outlined in the Dates section, this +/- 3 day 
window will be used. This will prevent significant overlap in event windows for 
individual events, and allow for sufficient precision in calculations to address the risk of a 
“no results” finding. This method will also be employed for agency rulings.  
Earnings announcements, which are incorporated into share prices within one day 
(Fama, 1991) differ from regulatory, legislative and political developments due to the 
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level of complexity of rulings and bills and the need to understand and assess the ultimate 
outcome on organizations. Thus, it is reasonable to use a longer event window for this 
study, as supported by the methods used by other event study researchers as discussed 
previously. 
Companies Selected.  One underlying assumption of the event study 
methodology is the normal distribution of data. Brown and Warner (1985) emphasize that 
non-normality of data proves especially problematic when event windows are based on 
daily events. Corrado (2011) concludes that active markets, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), typically have sufficient normality of share price data to overcome 
these challenges. Within the companies actively traded on the NYSE, there are 16 
companies classified as healthcare insurers based on their SIC or NAICS code. These 
include the following: 
 
Table 2 
Companies Selected for Analysis 
Company Name Exchange Ticker Symbol 
Aetna Inc. NYSE AET 
  AFLAC Inc. NYSE AFL 
Anthem Inc. (formerly Wellpoint) NYSE ANTHM (WLP) 
Assurant Inc. NYSE AIZ 
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Centene Corp. NYSE CNC 
Cigna Corp. NYSE CI 
CNO Financial Health Group Inc. NYSE CNO 
Health Net Inc. NYSE HNT 
Humana Inc. NYSE HUM 
Molina Healthcare Inc. NYSE MOH 
Principal Financial Group NYSE PFG 
Reinsurance Group of America Inc. NYSE RGA 
Stancorp Financial Group Inc. NYSE SFG 
UnitedHealth Group Inc. NYSE UNH 
Unum Group NYSE UNM 
WellCare Health Plans Inc. NYSE WCG 
When evaluating the impact of a regulatory event, Schwert (1981) suggests the 
use of a portfolio-level calculation to address the concern that regulatory changes impact 
multiple firms; this method will be utilized during this study. These 16 companies will 
comprise the healthcare insurer portfolio based on their shared SICS (6321 or 6324) or 
NAICS code (524114) classification. The use of a portfolio of companies is also 
supported by the research conducted by Firth (1976), which found that earnings 
announcements are absorbed into the share prices of close competitors. Efficient markets 
incorporate information from a variety of sources, and using a portfolio of companies will 
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best reduce the presence of confounding variables that may impact an individual 
company’s share price.  
Indices. As discussed by Canina, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1998) selection 
of an index should consider the index in which the selected companies are included; for 
example, if the companies are members of the S&P 500 index, then it would be 
appropriate to use this as a basis. However, in cases where a larger sample of companies 
are being evaluated, it is appropriate to use a broader index. In the case of this study, not 
all 16 insurers are members of the S&P 500, but all are actively traded on the NYSE. As 
a result, the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index (ticker NYA) is an appropriate 
index. Based on the research of Canina et al. (1998), which demonstrated that value-
weighted indices are a better representation of portfolios held by investors and are 
statistically preferable, a value-weighted index will be utilized, which is the case for 
NYA.  
Data Sources – Share Prices. To institute a consistent level of measurement, the 
event day share price will be based on the closing share price as reported by the 
respective market; should the event occur on a day in which the financial markets are 
closed, the subsequent trading day will be used. (The use of the subsequent trading day is 
the accepted method in event studies to address non-trading days, as discussed in Bloom, 
2011.) Open source data on close of business day share prices for the 16 insurers will be 
obtained from Qwandl and validated for reliability and validity on the basis of a random 
sample with another independent source, Yahoo! Finance. The share prices for the 
selected index (NYA) is the New York Stock Exchange official website; given the nature 
of this as the source data, no validation of share prices is considered necessary. 
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Estimation Period.  The estimation period serves as the benchmark of time used 
to establish expectations regarding a normal rate of return. As discussed by Salinger 
(1992), errors may occur when the event window and the estimation period overlap, and 
thus careful consideration of dates must be made. When using monthly data 
measurements, studies commonly use five to seven years of data to determine the 
estimation period (Binder, 1998). In the case of daily data measurements a 120-day 
estimation window period is commonly used (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003), 
although the use of 30, 60, or 90 day periods are also utilized. However, when events 
occur in close proximity to one another, it is important to reduce the overlap of event 
dates with the estimation windows (Khansa, Cook, James, & Bruyaka, 2012). Given that 
the event window is based on periods of days, and considering the number of events 
measured, a 30-day window will be utilized. 
 
Section 3: Measures 
 As discussed previously, application of the event study methodology to regulatory 
events requires specific consideration of challenges. The following table outlines certain 
of these key considerations. 
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Table 3 
Event Study Considerations 
# Issue Response Reference 
1 It is unclear when expectations 
change. 
Allow for broad event 
windows but balance with 
likelihood that a large window 
will create a “no effect” 
response. 
Binder (1985), 
Brown & 
Warner (1980), 
Lamdin (2001) 
2 Regulatory events are more 
likely to be anticipated. 
Similar to issue #1, consider 
broadening event window. 
Error on side of earliest 
placement of event date. 
Break regulatory process into 
“micro events” for analysis. 
Binder (1985), 
Lamdin 
(2001), 
Mulherin 
(2007) 
3 One industry may have 
“winners” and “losers” as a 
result of the same legislation. 
Evaluate results for a portfolio 
of companies. 
Binder (1985) 
4 Confounding variables may 
make it unclear if prices change 
as a result of an industry-
specific shock or regulatory 
event. 
Review the Wall Street 
Journal, Business & Finance 
Section, for the trading day 
subsequent to the event day to 
identify what analysts believe 
Binder (1985), 
McWilliams & 
Siegel (1997), 
Larcker, 
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was the driver of market 
returns on that day.  
Ormazabal & 
Taylor (2011) 
6 Share price changes may be 
inconsistent with other metrics. 
Acknowledged limitation that 
market response may not 
indicate true impact of 
regulation. 
Lamdin 
(2001), 
Reynolds 
(2008)   
7 Sample sizes may be 
insufficient to evaluate market 
reaction. 
All NYSE health insurers are 
selected for evaluation, based 
on SICS and NAICS codes. 
Lamdin (2001) 
8 Cross-sectional dependence 
may occur when events are 
“clustered”. 
Ensure event period is 
relatively short compared to 
estimation window. 
Brown & 
Warner (1980), 
Binder (1998) 
9 Expected return model used 
may not appropriately reflect 
normal return.    
Use the Market Model, 
allowing use of actual share 
data, and careful selection of 
an appropriate index. 
Kothari & 
Warner (2006), 
Brown & 
Warner (1985) 
 
Examples of potential confounding variables would include events that would potentially 
have an impact on healthcare industry participants that are more significant than other 
financial market participants. Examples could include such items as outbreaks of 
diseases, shortages of key pharmaceuticals, new or revised healthcare regulations not 
within the scope of this study, events specific to individual companies within the insurer 
portfolio unrelated to the ACA, etc.   
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In summary, there are critical decision points regarding the selection of dates and 
sample sizes, and careful considerations of compounding variables must occur. Literature 
addressing these specific elements of event studies will facilitate the implementation of 
methodology for this study. 
Regarding Normality of Data. There are several expected return models 
available for use in event studies, including the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the 
mean-adjusted return model, the market-adjusted return model, and the market model.  
The CAPM has largely been rejected as a model of expected returns (Khotari & Warner, 
2006), given the post-earnings announcement effect (Ball & Brown, 1968). The mean-
adjusted return model and the market-adjusted return model both rely on a simple 
arithmetic average in their calculation of abnormal returns and thus are prone to outliers. 
In contrast, the market model uses the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS) to minimize 
the impact of outliers (Khotari & Warner, 2006). The market model has been selected for 
use in this study. 
However, many tools used to evaluate abnormal returns are parametric tests in 
which normality of data is assumed. This includes the Patell Z-test, which is a parametric, 
standardized abnormal return test commonly used in event studies (Bloom, 2012), as well 
as the Boehmer test statistic. The most common way to address non-normality of data in 
event studies is to pair parametric tests with nonparametric tests such as the Rank and 
Sign tests which do not assume data is normally distributed. In this manner, differences 
between parametric and nonparametric test results may indicate instances where data is 
not normally distributed; this allows each series of tests to serve as a robustness check 
against one another (Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997). 
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Corrado (2011) concludes that active markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), typically have sufficient normality of share price data to overcome these challenges, 
and use of an index in this study (the NYSE Stock Exchange Index, ticker NYA) alleviates 
concerns about normality of data for the market benchmark. Individual insurer returns for the 
legislative and regulatory event categories will be evaluated for normality of data to inform 
reliance upon parametric and nonparametric test results. 
 
Section 4: Pilot Study 
 In order to evaluate the data sources, underlying assumptions, and overall 
methodology that will be used in this research, a pilot study was conducted. The event 
day of November 4, 2008, representing the election of President Obama, was selected as 
it represents a triggering event for all subsequent ACA-related developments. While this 
is not directly related to the research questions posed in this study, it does provide an 
opportunity to evaluate the overall methodology and assumptions. Calculations for this 
date are not expected to have a significant Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for the 
16 insurers tested.  
 As discussed previously, share prices for the 16 insurers for all dates in the 
estimation and event windows were obtained from Qwandl; share prices for the index 
(NYA) was obtained from the official New York Stock Exchange website. Calculations 
were generated using Event Study Metrics software. The estimation window used was 30 
days, while the event window was the three trading days prior to and subsequent to 
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November 4, 2008. No significant modifications in approach or assumptions were 
identified as a result of this pilot study. 
Results were as follows: 
Table 4 
Daily Mean Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics Surrounding Pilot Event Date (N = 16) 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
  
Section 5: Data Analysis 
Analysis of abnormal returns and levels of significance will indicate whether the 
financial markets reacted to identified events for the portfolio of health insurers, and 
Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns T test 
Patell 
Z 
Boehmer 
Test 
Statistic 
Rank 
Test 
Sign 
Test 
        
-3 -0.06 -0.06 1.19 0.79 0.66 0.58 1.39 
-2 0.01 -0.05 3.06** 3.00** 4.37*** 1.55 2.39* 
-1 0.05 0.00 2.16* 2.20* 2.37* 1.19 1.89 
0 -0.02 -0.03 -1.58 -2.37* -1.53 -0.67 -0.61 
1 0.04 0.01 0.54 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.89 
2 0.04 0.05 1.89 1.45 1.71* 0.87 1.89* 
3 0.00 0.05 1.67 0.98 1.07 0.37 0.89 
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whether such reactions were positive or negative.  Specific metrics evaluated will be 
summarized below, followed by a further discussion of the results of the pilot study.  
The Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) amount represents the 
accumulated amount of abnormal returns over the event window, and is converted into 
percentages for an understanding of market return rates. In an event study, the CAAR 
serves as an effect size, since it provides information on the size of the difference 
between normal returns and the abnormal returns experienced as a result of an event. 
The T test demonstrates whether the mean of a population significantly differs from the 
mean of another population when assessing the Average Abnormal Returns. When 
evaluating the statistical significance of abnormal returns, it is valuable to pair 
parametric and nonparametric tests (Bloom, 2011). Parametric tests assume that 
individual firms’ results are normally distributed, while nonparametric tests make no 
such assumption. The Patell Z score and Boehmer Test statistics represent parametric 
tests, while the Rank Test and the Sign Test are nonparametric.  
The Patell Z score shows the statistical significance of the abnormal return, 
aggregated for all firms (Patell, 1976). Similarly, the Boehmer Test statistic shows the 
statistical significance of the abnormal return, aggregated for all firms but uniquely 
addresses issues of event clustering (volatility-changing events) (Boehmer, Musumeci, 
& Poulsen, 1991). The Rank Test shows the statistical significance of the abnormal 
return, aggregated for all firms, and is proven robust against event-induced volatility and 
cross-correlation (Corrado, 1989; Corrado & Zivney, 1992). The Sign Test compares the 
percentage of positive abnormal returns close to an event to the percentage found during 
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a normal period. Since the focus is on the overall percentage of abnormal returns, 
volatility does not impact these results (Cowan, 1992). 
A summary of the test results for each daily return is shown in Table 4. These 
results showed a cumulative average abnormal price return (in comparison to the New 
York Stock Exchange Composite Index) for days -3 to the event day of -3.0%. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns on day -2 were -5.0%, statistically significant at the 
.001 level for the Boehmer test statistic, at .01 for the Patell and T tests, and at .05 for the 
Sign test. Nonparametric tests thus confirm the parametric test results. No other 
individual days demonstrated statistical significance.  
As discussed previously, for dates that demonstrate statistically significant results, 
an additional step will be taken to identify confounding variables (Larker, Ormazabel, & 
Taylor, 2011). This will be addressed through review of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on 
the trading day subsequent to the event day. In this case, adjusted for non-trading days, 
day -2 is October 31, 2008; the subsequent WSJ publication day is November 1, 2008. 
Market fluctuations occurring on October 31, 2008 as discussed in the WSJ on November 
1, 2008 were largely attributed to fluctuations in oil and commodity prices. Given the 
nature of health insurers, this is not deemed to be a significant confounding variable that 
would alter conclusions. 
 As discussed further in the Limitations section, very specific and limited steps are 
being taken to identify confounding variables. Examples of potential confounding 
variables would include events that would potentially have an impact on healthcare 
industry participants that are more significant than other financial market participants. 
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Examples could include such items as outbreaks of diseases, shortages of key 
pharmaceuticals, new or revised healthcare regulations not within the scope of this study, 
events specific to individual companies within the insurer portfolio unrelated to the ACA, 
etc. A more exhaustive search for additional confounding variables represents an 
opportunity for future research. 
 
Chapter 3 Overview 
 Chapter 3 comprised an overview of the research design and event study 
methodology that will be used in this research project. Participant selection, relevant 
measures and data collection procedures, as well as an overview of data analysis, were 
provided. In particular, complexities of the event study method when applied to 
regulatory and legislative events were discussed, and key estimates and assumptions were 
outlined that are important inputs to the calculations. A pilot study was conducted for one 
date to demonstrate how the data will be collected, used, and how calculations will be 
presented within Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
As discussed in previous chapters, the purpose of this study is to answer one 
important question for the Affordable Care Act and in particular the introduction of a 
consistent, nation-wide MLR requirement: has it been associated with changes in the 
share prices of publicly traded health insurers? Specifically: 
1. What is the relationship between legislative developments related to the 
establishment of the Affordable Care Act and changes in share prices of publicly 
traded health insurers?  
2. What is the relationship between regulatory events related to the establishment of 
the federal Medical Loss Ratio and changes in share prices of publicly traded 
health insurers? 
Given that the ACA was the federal legislation that established the MLR, in order 
to understand market reaction to the MLR it is necessary to examine the response to the 
ACA itself in its various iterations. Examining the MLR through the lens of the overall 
response to the ACA will allow us to understand how the MLR requirements are 
associated with changes in share prices. Market reactions to regulatory developments 
associated with the MLR provide a separate view into the perceived importance of the 
ratio. 
The relationship between ACA events and changes in share prices will be 
measured using event study methodology to evaluate key announcements and 
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clarifications associated with the Accountable Care Act and the Medical Loss Ratio 
requirements. Each event will be assessed to determine if it had a measurable relationship 
(in the form of a Cumulative Average Abnormal Return or CAAR) on changes in the 
closing daily stock price of United States publicly traded health insurers, controlling for 
overall market performance. In an event study, the CAAR serves as an effect size, since it 
provides information on the size of the difference between normal returns and the 
abnormal returns experienced as a result of an event. 
 Through this analysis, overall trends of market perception of the ACA’s MLR 
provisions and MLR regulatory developments will become apparent. Events will be 
categorized as legislative or regulatory, and evaluated in a three-day event window for 
the period before and after an event.  
This chapter will address the following hypotheses: 
H1: Cumulative average abnormal price returns (compared to the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index) for public company insurers will be less than 
zero for the period -3 to +3 for legislative events.  
H2:  Cumulative average abnormal price returns (compared to the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index) for public company insurers will be less than 
zero for the period -3 to +3 for regulatory events. 
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Hypothesis 1: Legislative Events 
 Drafts of ACA legislation included differing requirements related to Medical Loss 
Ratio reporting and rebate levels. Understanding the overall market reaction to legislative 
events associated with the ACA, including iterations of MLR requirements, is a necessary 
first step in answering the research questions. 
 An initial review of the normality of return data was conducted for all legislative 
events and all 16 insurers, for all trading days in the 30 day estimation window and +3 
event window. This information indicates the extent to which parametric tests may be 
impacted by non-normality of data. Skewness calculations for this data set demonstrated 
slightly positive skew of 0.95, with a median of 0.17%, and mean of 0.23%.  Since the 
0.95 skewness is within the range of -1.00 to +1.00, then the return data is considered 
normal (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, & Barrett, 2004). Kurtosis calculations demonstrated 
a leptokurtic distribution (defined as greater than the normal distribution rate of 3.00); 
return data kurtosis was 12.95. This higher kurtosis level results from infrequent extreme 
deviations or outliers in insurer return data. Given that nonparametric tests are designed 
to address non-normality of data (such as when kurtosis is high), the combination of 
parametric and nonparametric test results addresses high levels of kurtosis. Tests used are 
sufficiently robust to address skewness and kurtosis calculation results. 
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Table 5 
Daily Mean Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics Surrounding Legislative Event Dates 
(N = 16) 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
A summary of the test results for each daily return is shown in Table 5. These 
results showed a cumulative average abnormal price return (in comparison to the New 
York Stock Exchange Composite Index) for the period from day -3 to 3 of -1.48%. These 
results were not statistically significant for any of the tests performed. Cumulative 
average abnormal returns on day -3 were -1.0%, statistically significant at the .05 level 
for the T test, Boehmer test statistic, Rank and Sign tests. Nonparametric tests thus 
confirm the parametric test results. No other individual days demonstrated consistent 
Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns T test 
Patell 
Z 
Boehmer 
Test 
Statistic 
Rank 
Test 
Sign 
Test 
        
-3 -0.01 -0.01 -2.42* -1.21 -0.92* 0.86* 2.20* 
-2 0.00 -0.01 -1.76* -0.42 -0.30 -0.53 -0.26 
-1 -0.01 -0.01 -1.68* -0.44 -0.35 -0.58 -0.26 
0 0.00 -0.02 -1.84* -0.28 -0.23 -0.39 -1.14 
1 0.00 -0.01 -0.36 1.02 0.76 0.09 -0.61 
2 0.00 -0.02 -1.05 0.42 0.29 -0.14 -0.26 
3 0.00 -0.01 -0.79 0.76 0.58 -0.10 0.10 
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results with statistical significance. These results suggest that the selected ACA-related 
legislative events in aggregate did not have a significant relationship to changes in share 
prices of the publicly traded health insurers. The hypothesis is not supported. 
 
A Review of Individual Legislative Event Dates 
Moving from an aggregate legislative category view, the next analytical step is to 
consider individual components of that category: share price activity associated with 
individual legislative dates. Once individual dates are assessed, we can better understand 
the MLR content within the draft legislation to form a more complete picture about the 
market’s response to MLR.  
When considering individual dates within the overall legislative category, one 
date did reflect results of note: June 9, 2009. On this date, the Senate Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) was the first Senate committee to submit 
a draft bill on healthcare legislation to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for 
review. The HELP Committee draft included individual mandates, state exchanges, 
subsidies for low income individuals, and for small businesses; many of these elements 
were ultimately included in the final ACA legislation. Chronologically, as demonstrated 
in Table 1, this was the earliest draft produced of ACA legislation within the House or 
Senate. As such, it represents the first opportunity for the financial markets to respond to 
draft healthcare reform legislation in any format. As documented within the CBO’s cost 
estimate of the draft legislation dated June 15, 2009, the HELP Committee draft did 
include requirements related to Medical Loss Ratios, with the provision that the HHS 
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Secretary would have the authority to set the levels at which rebates would be required 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2009).  
The results for event date June 9, 2009 were as follows: 
Table 6 
Daily Mean Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics Surrounding June 9, 2009 (N = 16) 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
Cumulative average abnormal returns for the period from -3 to 3 days for event 
date of June 9, 2009 was -9.46%, with statistical significance at the p < 0.001 level for 
the Boehmer and Sign tests, and at p < 0.01 for the T and Patell Z tests. Note that the 
Rank test did not demonstrate any statistically significant results during the event 
window. With the exception of the lack of statistically significant Rank test results, 
parametric and nonparametric tests were consistent. The average abnormal returns 
Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns T test Patell Z 
Boehmer 
Test 
Statistic 
Rank 
Test Sign Test 
        
-3 -0.01 -0.01 -3.44*** -4.02*** -6.22*** -1.82 -3.28*** 
-2 0.00 -0.01 -3.29*** -3.86*** -5.62*** -1.76 3.28*** 
-1 -0.03 -0.04 -2.97** -3.52*** -5.95*** -1.73 -2.78** 
0 -0.03 -0.06 -2.41* -2.79* -7.60*** -1.59 -3.78*** 
1 0.00 -0.06 -1.87 -2.19* -5.08*** -1.07 -2.78** 
2 -0.02 -0.08 -2.70** -3.13** -6.34*** -1.54 -3.28*** 
3 -0.01 -0.09 -2.82** -3.18** -6.56*** -1.59 -3.28*** 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  101 
 
 
 
produced each day from day -3 to day 3 were consistently negative (with days -2 and 1 
both producing average abnormal returns of -0.2%) and test results demonstrating 
statistical significance at the p < 0.001 or p < 0.01 levels.  
 
A Review of Individual Insurer Share Prices for Event Date June 9, 2009 
After considering aggregate legislative category results, as well as a view of share 
price fluctuations for specific days within that category, the next refinement of data is to 
evaluate individual companies’ share price performance. Considering individual 
company share performance on event date June 9, 2009, all insurers experienced negative 
cumulative abnormal returns for the period from -3 to 3 days with the exception of 
Assurant (ticker AIZ), with positive returns of 7.4%. This is in comparison to cumulative 
average abnormal returns that reflect much larger negative returns for this period. 
Excluding AIZ from the analysis of the June 9, 2009 legislative event date, CAARs 
through event date + 3 / - 3 were 10.58% (in comparison to the 9.46% including AIZ). 
This was statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level for the T, Patell Z, and Boehmer 
test statistics.  
A summary of individual insurer cumulative average abnormal returns for the 
period from -3 to 3 days for event date June 9, 2009 is as follows: 
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Table 7 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for June 9, 2009 (-3 to 3) By Insurer 
Ticker 
Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns 
AET -0.14 
AFL -0.07 
ANTHM -0.08 
AIZ 0.07 
CNC -0.03 
CI -0.14 
CNO -0.19 
HNT -0.15 
HUM -0.08 
MOH -0.08 
PFG -0.07 
RGA -0.08 
SFG -0.10 
UNH -0.17 
UNM -0.02 
WCG -0.17 
 A review of the Wall Street Journal Business & Finance Section for the trading 
day subsequent to the June 9, 2009 event date (Wednesday, June 10, 2009) in an effort to 
identify obvious signs of confounding variables did not identify any events that appear to 
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invalidate the results previously discussed. Financial market drivers were attributed to 
government bailout of financial institutions and automotive industry firms.  
 
Summary: Legislative Events 
 In summary, the aggregate category of legislative events was not shown to have a 
statistically significant relationship to changes in share prices of publicly traded health 
insurers. The hypothesis was thus not upheld. However, when reviewing individual event 
dates within the overall legislative category, there was one date for which publicly traded 
health insurers did experience statistically significant cumulative average abnormal 
returns: June 9, 2009. On that date, the first draft of ACA legislation, with MLR 
requirements, was produced by the HELP Committee. Refining the investigation further, 
for the June 9, 2009 event date, all insurers experienced negative cumulative average 
abnormal returns with the exception of Assurant, whose shares demonstrated a 
cumulative average abnormal return of 7.4%. The scope of the HELP Committee 
legislation makes it difficult to determine the extent to which the inclusion of the MLR 
requirements are related to changes in share prices; however, it does provide context for 
the market’s overall assessment of the ACA. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Regulatory Events 
 An initial review of the normality of return data was conducted for all regulatory 
events and all 16 insurers, for all trading days in the 30 day estimation window and +3 
event window. This information indicates the extent to which parametric tests may be 
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impacted by non-normality of data. Skewness calculations for this data set demonstrated 
negative skew of -2.91, with a median of 0.05%, and mean of 0.03%.  Since the -2.91 
skewness is outside of the range of -1.00 to +1.00, then the return data is not considered 
normal (Morgan, et al., 2004). This indicates that nonparametric tests may prove more 
reliable than parametric tests when evaluating the cumulative average abnormal returns. 
Kurtosis calculations demonstrated a leptokurtic distribution (defined as greater than the 
normal distribution rate of 3.00); return data kurtosis was 56.33. This higher kurtosis 
level results from infrequent extreme deviations or outliers in insurer return data. Given 
that nonparametric tests are designed to address non-normality of data (such as when 
kurtosis is high), nonparametric tests address this distribution of data. Tests used are 
sufficiently robust to address skewness and kurtosis calculation results. 
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Table 8 
Daily Mean Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics Surrounding Regulatory Event Dates 
(N = 16) 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
A summary of the test results for each daily return is shown in Table 8. These 
results showed a cumulative average abnormal price return (in comparison to the New 
York Stock Exchange Composite Index) for period day -3 to 3 of 1.9%. This was 
statistically significant at the p <0.05 level for the T, Patell Z, and Boehmer Test 
Statistics. Sign test results of 1.69 for day -3 to 3 were reported at p < .10. More 
noticeable were the results for day 0, which reflected a cumulative average abnormal 
return of 1.6%, statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level for the Patell Z and Boehmer 
Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns T test Patell Z 
Boehmer 
Test 
Statistic 
Rank 
Test 
Sign 
Test 
        
-3 0.00 0.00 4.09*** 3.75*** 3.54*** 1.12 3.10* 
-2 0.01 0.01 4.34*** 4.36*** 3.81*** 1.38 3.63*** 
-1 0.00 0.01 1.78 2.17* 1.93 0.47 1.69 
0 0.01 0.02 3.09** 4.48*** 4.08*** 1.51 1.87 
1 0.00 0.02 2.27* 2.63** 2.35* 0.78 1.51 
2 0.00 0.02 2.88** 3.73*** 3.25** 1.24 2.22* 
3 0.00 0.02 2.29* 2.46* 2.52* 0.78 1.69 
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Test statistics, and at the p < 0.01 level for the T test. Considered in aggregate, these 
results demonstrate that the identified regulatory events are associated with a slightly 
positive change in share prices for publicly traded insurers. The hypothesis was not 
upheld. 
It is important to note that while the parametric (Patell Z and Boehmer) and 
nonparametric (Rank and Sign) test results were directionally consistent, since the insurer 
returns in the regulatory category of data were found to be negatively skewed, parametric 
tests may be unreliable. Nonparametric tests provide the primary evidence that the 
hypothesis was not upheld. 
 
A Review of a Subcategory of Regulatory Events 
 Within the larger category of regulatory events, there are three dates on which 
similar CMS publications occurred: the release of their reports on “The 80/20 Rule” for 
each preceding year. In this report, CMS outlines the results for the MLR filings by state 
and line of business, including rebate amounts. The CMS report allows better readers to 
easily compare and understand market dynamics in each jurisdiction and line of business 
category. However, to the extent that individual insurers had previously issued press 
releases or other communications regarding their rebate obligations, this information may 
already have been incorporated into share prices (assuming the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency). For example, Aetna’s rebate distribution and communication schedule 
for 2011 rebates included activity beginning on June 19, 2012, in advance of the CMS 
report publication date on June 21, 2012 (Aetna, 2012).  
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 As discussed in Table 1 on June 21, 2012, February 15, 2013, and June 20, 2013, 
CMS issued publications associated with the 80/20 Rule. A summary of test results for 
only dates associated with 80/20 Rule publications by CMS are as follows: 
Table 9 
Daily Mean Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics Surrounding 80/20 Rule Publication 
Dates (N = 16) 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 A summary of the test results for each daily return is shown in Table 9. These 
results showed a cumulative average abnormal price return (in comparison to the New 
York Stock Exchange Composite Index) for the period from day -3 to day 3 of 1.9%. 
Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns T test Patell Z 
Boehmer 
Test 
Statistic 
Rank 
Test 
Sign 
Test 
        
-3 0.00 0.00 2.47* 3.05** 2.50* 0.92 1.66 
-2 0.00 0.00 2.43* 2.88** 2.22* 0.98 2.52* 
-1 0.00 0.01 2.09* 2.55* 2.01* 0.92 1.95 
0 0.01 0.02 3.92*** 4.86*** 4.31*** 2.07* 3.10* 
1 0.00 0.01 1.67 1.82 1.38 0.59 0.79 
2 0.00 0.02 1.99 1.98* 1.50 0.71 1.37 
3 0.00 0.02 1.82 1.88 1.84 0.72 1.08 
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These results were not statistically significant for any of the tests performed. Cumulative 
average abnormal returns on event day 0 were also 1.9%, statistically significant at the 
0.001 level for the T, Patell Z, and Boehmer Test statistics, and at the .05 level for the 
Rank and Sign tests. Nonparametric tests thus confirm the parametric test results, 
although since the regulatory return data is not normally distributed, nonparametric tests 
provide the primary evidence for these conclusions.  
 Before a conclusion can be reached regarding the relationship between the 80/20 
rule publications and share prices, an initial search for confounding variables must be 
made for event dates June 21, 2012, February 15, 2013, and June 20, 2013. Financial 
market activity for June 21, 2012 was attributed to declining profitability within the 
financial sector; for February 15, 2013 to the G-20 efforts on monetary policy and the 
natural gas market; and for June 20, 2013 it was attributed to the wind down of the 
Federal bond buying program. All information was based on the Wall Street Journal 
Business and Finance section summary of financial market drivers for the day subsequent 
to the event day. None of these identified drivers present an obvious confounding 
variable that would invalidate results. 
 
A Review of Individual Regulatory Event Dates 
Following the approach used for the legislative events, I will now proceed to 
evaluating individual dates within the overall regulatory category. This evaluation 
demonstrated that the directionally positive results for CAARs were consistent among the 
eight individual regulatory events dates. These typically produced CAARs in the -3 to 3 
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event day window of positive CAARs between 0% and 3%; one date did demonstrate 
significantly higher percentage CAARs in that -3 to 3 day event window: December 2, 
2011. On that date, CMS issued technical release 2011-4, Guidance on Rebates for 
Group Health Plans Paid Pursuant to the Medical Loss Ratio Requirements. The results 
for event date December 2, 2011 were as follows: 
Table 10 
Daily Mean Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics Surrounding December 2, 2011 (N = 
16) 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
Day 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Returns T test 
Patell 
Z 
Boehmer 
Test 
Statistic 
Rank 
Test 
Sign 
Test 
        
-3 0.01 0.01 3.07** 2.94** 3.20** 0.51 2.06* 
-2 0.06 0.06 3.04** 2.68** 3.05** 0.35 2.06* 
-1 -0.01 0.05 -1.01 -1.12 -2.02* -0.57 -1.44 
0 -0.01 0.05 -1.06 -1.19 -2.98** -0.60 -1.94 
1 0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.20 -0.32 -0.17 0.06 
2 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.16 -0.23 -0.17 -0.44 
3 0.00 0.06 0.27 0.27 0.35 -0.03 0.06 
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While CAARs of 5.6% were experienced through day -3 to 3 for event date 
December 2, 2011, this was not statistically significant. Activity from period -3 to -2, 
with a CAAR of 6.4%, did reflect statistically significant T, Patel Z, and Boehmer test 
statistics at the p < 0.01 level. Therefore, while the cumulative average abnormal returns 
for this date were large, they were not statistically significant.  
A review of individual share price activity for the period from day -3 to 3 for 
event date December 2, 2011 provides insight into why the results shown in the table 
above do not represent statistically significant results. Cumulative abnormal returns 
during this period range from – 10.0% for WellCare Health Plans (WCG) to 20.4% for 
Principal Financial Group (PFG). Accordingly, there do not appear to be consistent trends 
regarding the relationship between this event date and fluctuations in individual insurer 
share prices.  
A preliminary search for confounding variables based on the Wall Street Journal 
Business and Finance section discussion significant market drivers for trading day 
December 2, 2011 (publication date December 3, 2011) attributed market fluctuations to 
unemployment rate reporting, noting that the rate had dropped to its lowest point in 32 
months. This did not present any indication of confounding variables that would 
invalidate conclusions discussed. 
 
Summary: Regulatory Events 
As outlined previously, events within the overall regulatory category resulted in 
slightly positive cumulative average abnormal returns for publicly traded health insurers. 
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Further examining regulatory events relating to CMS publications on the 80/20 Rule 
demonstrated that cumulative average abnormal returns on those dates were also slightly 
positive, but not statistically significant. One individual regulatory event date (December 
2, 2011) did demonstrate large cumulative average abnormal returns but they were not 
statistically significant; review of individual share performance for that date made it clear 
why returns were not statistically significant, given there did not appear to be consistent 
trends for individual share prices.  
 
Results: In Conclusion 
 The overall hypotheses regarding legislative and regulatory event dates were not 
upheld, as within the legislative category there were not statistically significant results 
and for the regulatory category, cumulative average abnormal returns were slightly 
positive. However, refining calculations to individual dates and individual insurers did 
demonstrate findings of note: specifically, the share prices of insurers for legislative 
event date of June 9, 2009 experienced significant negative cumulative average abnormal 
returns. One insurer – Assurant – experienced positive cumulative average abnormal 
returns, unlike the other companies in the insurer population. In Chapter 5, these findings 
will be further discussed and analyzed in light of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
implications for further research. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 The intention of this study was to examine the following research question: what 
is the relationship between the Affordable Care Act and the requirements related to the 
Medical Loss Ratio in particular, and the share prices of publicly traded health insurers? 
Specifically: 
1. What is the relationship between legislative developments related to the 
establishment of the Affordable Care Act and changes in share prices of publicly 
traded health insurers?  
2. What is the relationship between regulatory events related to the establishment of 
the federal Medical Loss Ratio and changes in share prices of publicly traded 
health insurers? 
The answers to these questions have important implications for not only employees and 
leaders of those insurers, but also for investors, politicians, and other healthcare industry 
participants, as they seek maximize their investments, assess and respond to public 
opinion, and navigate the impact of new regulations. 
  As discussed previously, the ACA is arguably the most important political, 
legislative, and regulatory development in the healthcare industry within the last fifty 
years, with implications for healthcare access, payment mechanisms, and quality of care. 
The scope and the complexity of the Act poses difficulty for those seeking to isolate its 
impact: researchers judge it too early to measure quality impacts and highly difficult to 
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measure the overall impact on healthcare costs (Blumenthal, Abrams, & Nuzum, 2015). 
In contrast share prices represent one measure that can be assessed contemporaneously 
and serve as an early indicator of the financial market’s perception of the ACA for 
publicly traded health insurers. In particular, the MLR represents a key area of focus in 
this study given its effective limitation on the profitability of insurers. While selected 
state MLR’s did exist prior to the ACA, the Act served to make these consistent, more 
stringent than state ratio limits, and created highly visible metrics (Harrington, 2013).  
 Understanding the implications of the ACA and its MLR requirements for health 
insurers is of relevance not only for the publicly traded insurers and their employees, but 
also for not-for-profit insurers interested in financing options and employers managing 
their significant fringe benefit costs. Policyholders of these insurance companies also 
have the potential to be impacted by MLR rebates or the ancillary effects of premium 
reductions as insurers seek to manage their ratios. Further, the interconnectedness of the 
overall healthcare industry (Ewing, Kruse, & Thompson, 2008) further supports that 
other industry players, such as healthcare providers and pharmaceutical companies, could 
be impacted by developments impacting insurers.  
 A foundational theory relating to fluctuations in share prices is Fama’s Efficient 
Market Hypothesis, which addresses how information is incorporated into share prices. 
As discussed by Ball and Brown (2014), share prices are simply the result of information 
flows as investors seek to learn, assess, and conclude on the information obtained. The 
semi-strong form of market efficiency is the basis for this study, assuming that all public 
information is incorporated into share prices. The fluctuations in share prices during the 
time period analyzed might not represent the actual overall financial impact of the ACA 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  114 
 
 
 
and MLR provisions; as researched by Reynolds (2008) in her review of anti-dumping 
regulations, initial assessments may differ significantly from eventual outcomes. The 
EMH does not measure the quality of decisions made by rational or irrational investors, 
nor does it draw a conclusion about the accuracy of the appropriateness of the directional 
fluctuation (increase or decrease) or significance of the change. Similarly, this study does 
not seek to conclude on the quality or accuracy of decisions made by investors in 
response to ACA and MLR developments but rather to understand the nature of the share 
prices and decisions made by investors, reflected in the changes in share prices. 
 In order to answer the overall research questions, two specific hypotheses were 
developed: 
H1: Cumulative average abnormal price returns (compared to the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index) for public company insurers will be less than 
zero for the period -3 to +3 for legislative events.  
H2:  Cumulative average abnormal price returns (compared to the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index) for public company insurers will be less than 
zero for the period -3 to +3 for regulatory events. 
In sum, the hypotheses expected legislative and regulatory events to be associated with a 
negative change in share prices for health insurers. These hypotheses were informed by 
the findings of Pastor and Veronesi (2012), who found that announcements of policy 
changes tend to be accompanied by decreased share prices. The event study method was 
used to explore changes in share prices of 16 publicly traded health insurers based on 
shared NAICS or SIC codes, all actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The 
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period of interest was from November 4, 2008 (the election of President Obama) to 
March 23, 2015, the five year anniversary of the Affordable Care Act. Neither hypothesis 
was supported based on this study; however, other findings of note were identified and 
will be discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
 When using the event study methodology, particularly as it relates to regulatory or 
legislative events, special care must be taken in regards to establishment of the event 
windows, estimation windows, and market index. As discussed in Chapter 3, the event 
dates themselves were selected based on a combination of legislative reviews of ACA 
developments, such as that provided by Cannan (2013), and various regulatory 
publications issued by CMS or others. The event window was +3/-3 days surrounding 
each event date, providing an opportunity to assess the period over which information 
was incorporated into share prices.  
 A market index is used to understand general market fluctuations over a period of 
time; as all insurers were actively traded on the NYSE, the NYSE Composite Index was 
used as a market index for the purpose of this study. An estimation window serves to 
provide an understanding of a “normal” relationship between the selected insurers and 
market index; in this case, the estimation window of 30 days was used to establish an 
understanding of this relationship. Care was taken to avoid overlap between event dates 
and estimation windows; accordingly, similar to the approach used by Khansa et al. 
(2012), events were eliminated from the calculations if they were within 30 days of 
another event. The portfolio approach recommended by Schwert (1981) was used to 
assess overall impacts on insurer share prices, with data collected and analyzed to further 
evaluate individual companies and dates in addition to overall portfolio impacts. As 
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discussed by Khotari and Warner (2006), the use of a portfolio of companies addresses 
the question of homoscedasticity – instances in which the “noise” or random disturbance 
between the independent and dependent variables is the same across all values of the 
independent variables.  
 This study relies on the foundational EMH theory to measure and understand the 
relationship between information and share prices: the event study method establishes a 
baseline expectation for share prices absent information associated with an event. An 
abnormal return is calculated for each day, and on a cumulative basis, for the three days 
prior to and three days subsequent to an event. By measuring price fluctuations for each 
day, and in aggregate, the impact of information is assessed for each individual day and 
for a portfolio of companies. This information is used to understand the relationship 
between that information and share prices. 
 
Analysis of Results 
 Similar approaches were taken to assess legislative and regulatory events, starting 
with a broad assessment of the portfolio of insurers and all events in their respective 
category, then refining to evaluate specific dates or individual companies within the 
initial study. In this manner, the two hypotheses were answered and other findings were 
developed that were ancillary to the initial hypotheses but related to the overall research 
questions. This analysis thus took a funnel effect, starting with a broad view and 
narrowing in focus to identify findings of note.  
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 For each event date, parametric and nonparametric tests were conducted and 
generated consistent results. The Patell Z score and Boehmer Test statistics represent 
parametric tests, while the Rank Test and the Sign Test are nonparametric. As discussed 
previously, event study calculations frequently include both types of measures to identify 
instances in which data is not normally distributed; test results between these two 
measure types were directionally consistent. An evaluation of normality of data for 
legislative events and insurer return data demonstrated that the data was normally 
distributed as it had a skewness of 0.95, within the range of -1.00 to +1.00 that defines 
normality of data (Morgan et al., 2004). However, for regulatory events skewness was -
2.91 and was determined to not be normally distributed. As a result, for this category of 
events nonparametric data provides the primary evidence for conclusions.  No special 
alterations or adjustments in calculations were required other than to evaluate parametric 
and nonparametric test results in light of normality of data as discussed.  
 For events with statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns, a 
preliminary search for confounding variables was conducted through a review of the Wall 
Street Journal Business & Finance Section for the subsequent trading day. In this case, 
event dates June 9, 2009, December 2, 2011 June 21, 2012, February 15, 2013, and June 
20, 2013 were subject to this review. It is a planned delimitation of this study to only 
conduct a cursory review of obvious confounding variables; in all cases, no such 
variables were identified. 
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Legislative Events 
 All Legislative Events. The initial hypothesis regarding all legislative 
events (7 in total) and all 16 insurers was not supported. While the cumulative average 
abnormal returns were negative, at -1.48%, as predicted, they were not statistically 
significant. These results suggest that the selected ACA and MLR-related legislative 
events in aggregate did not have a significant relationship to changes in share prices of 
the publicly traded health insurers. The hypothesis is not supported.  
Individual Legislative Events.  Using the funnel approach to further investigate 
this data, a subsequent step was taken to consider individual components of the overall 
category: share price activity associated with individual legislative dates. This did 
identify one key date, June 9, 2009, with statistically significant results and cumulative 
average abnormal returns of -9.46% for the +3/-3 event window. On this date, Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) was the first Senate 
committee to submit a draft bill on healthcare legislation to the Congressional Budget 
Office for review.  
The HELP Committee draft included requirements related to MLR and well as 
individual mandates, state exchanges, subsidies for low income individuals, and for small 
businesses; many of these elements were ultimately included in the final ACA legislation. 
Chronologically, as demonstrated in Table 1, this was the earliest draft produced of ACA 
and MLR legislation within the House or Senate. As such, it represents the first 
opportunity for the financial markets to respond to draft healthcare reform legislation in 
any format. The broad scope of the HELP Committee legislation makes it difficult to 
determine the extent to which the inclusion of the MLR requirements are related to 
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changes in share prices; however, it does provide context for the overall assessment of 
the ACA. 
It appears that the financial markets responded to this first draft in a significant 
and negative manner. All subsequent legislative events could be viewed as refinements of 
the initial information produced by the HELP Committee, with variations on subsidies, 
specific details regarding MLR requirements, exchanges, or other elements; however, the 
key components of the HELP draft remained intact in many subsequent versions – most 
notably the MLR. With this understanding, the semi-strong form of the EMH is 
supported and demonstrated through the incorporation of information into share prices 
for that initial June 9, 2009 date. The financial markets thus anticipated the overall ACA 
to have negative outcomes for publicly traded insurers; the extent to which this was 
attributed to the inclusion of the MLR requirements is difficult to determine. However, 
this strongly negative response has significant implications for both further research and 
for those in the healthcare profession, each of which will be explored in more detail in a 
following section.  
Individual Company Results.  A review of the individual insurers’ share price 
fluctuations for that June 9, 2009 date identified one anomaly to the overall negative 
change: Assurant (ticker AIZ) whose shares demonstrated a cumulative average abnormal 
return of 7.4%. Why did this insurer alone experience positive cumulative abnormal 
returns when all others experienced significantly negative results? According to an 8K 
document filed with the Securities Exchange Commission on June 10, 2009, on June 9, 
2009 Assurant reached a legal settlement with Willis Group Holdings Limited regarding 
a property reinsurance arrangement, resulting in the receipt of $139 million by Assurant 
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(Assurant Inc., 2009). This is clearly unrelated to the events associated with the ACA and 
presents a confounding variable; the results experienced by Assurant for event date June 
9, 2009 are thus not relevant to these research questions. The settlement of litigation and 
the accompanying likely impact on share prices represents a confounding variable that 
appears to have impacted the cumulative average abnormal return used in this study. This 
is experienced in both within the share prices for Assurant as an individual company, as 
well to a limited extent for the portfolio of insurers. As discussed previously, excluding 
AIZ from the analysis of the June 9, 2009 legislative event date, CAARs through event 
date + 3 / - 3 were 10.58% (in comparison to the 9.46% including AIZ). This was 
statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level for the T, Patell Z, and Boehmer test 
statistics.  
In summary, although the overall first hypothesis was not upheld, there was a 
significant and negative reaction by the financial markets to the first draft of the ACA, 
including MLR legislation, on June 9, 2009 for publicly traded health insurers. Given the 
nature of the semi-strong form of market efficiency as included within the EMH, it is 
perhaps unremarkable that subsequent versions of legislation did not have a similarly 
significant relationship to share prices. The initial information was released on June 9, 
2009, and the markets responded accordingly. These findings thus support the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. 
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Regulatory Events 
 All Regulatory Events & 80/20 Publication Subcategory.  Taking the same 
“funnel” approach for the evaluation of the second hypothesis, the results of analyzing 
eight regulatory events for the 16 insurers demonstrated positive cumulative average 
abnormal returns: 1.9% for the full -3/+3 period, and 1.6% for day 0 (the event day 
itself). The hypothesis was not upheld, and in fact is contradictory to the findings of 
Pastor & Veronesi (2012), who found that on average, regulatory policy announcements 
causes share prices to decrease. From the findings of this study, one could hypothesize 
that the market responded favorably to the decrease in uncertainty; as regulatory bodies 
refined the requirements of the MLR, the uncertainty of ultimate impact was reduced. 
However, this is only a hypothesis and more research would need to be conducted to 
better understand the ultimate cause of the increase in share prices arising from the 
aggregation of the regulatory events.  
 Moving from an overall category focus to a specific subcategory, there were also 
consistently positive cumulative abnormal returns associated with the CMS 80/20 Rule, 
in which CMS aggregates the overall MLR results by state and line of business, 
providing the market with a valuable view of the overall insurance industry and an 
additional method to evaluate performance of individual insurers in light of their 
competitors. For this subcategory, cumulative average abnormal returns were also 
positive and statistically significant for the event day (day 0). Again, these publications 
eliminated uncertainty, which could have been viewed positively by financial markets.  
 Within the overall regulatory event category and the 80/20 Rule category, slightly 
positive cumulative average abnormal returns were found. Why did the market respond 
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favorably to these announcements? Other than eliminating uncertainty, it is possible that 
organizations had already adjusted their strategic and operating models to incorporate 
their expectations regarding MLR’s, and the final regulatory requirements were less 
rigorous than anticipated. In this manner, understanding the actual (rather than 
interpreted) requirements could result in positive financial outcomes. 
  In the 80/20 Rule reports, CMS outlines the results for the MLR filings by state 
and line of business, including rebate amounts. The CMS report allows better readers to 
easily compare and understand market dynamics in each jurisdiction and line of business 
category. An overall favorable market reaction to the publication of this report over the 
three years during the period of analysis indicates that the report content provided new 
information – perhaps mitigating initial negative reactions for individual insurers as they 
issued their own rebate information. This would indicate that analysts were better able to 
evaluate individual company performance in context of the larger industry experience.  
 Individual Regulatory Events. No individual regulatory event dates produced 
statistically significant cumulative average abnormal returns; further, individual share 
price activity associated with regulatory dates varied dramatically among individual 
insurers. Thus, one could conclude that the financial markets assessed each individual 
regulatory development as it applied to each individual company, and that share price 
fluctuations reflected the different potential effect on each company. This would indicate 
that the overall regulation itself did not have a directionally consistent impact (i.e., 
negative for all insurers) but that it would have a targeted and specific outcome that 
differed by company. 
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 Alternatively, this could indicate that the individual regulatory MLR refinements 
are complex and nuanced, and not easily understood by the financial markets. A lack of 
widespread understanding of the impact on these events could be one cause of the “no 
effect” finding. Alternatively, perhaps these MLR regulations were well understood by 
the financial markets but so specific, and narrowly focused, as to not have a consistent or 
material impact on the company’s strategic or financial objectives.  
 The MLR is simply one element of the ACA, which also introduced a significant 
amount of complexity to the industry. As noted previously, the Kaiser Family Foundation 
(2012) found that only 37% and 35% of Americans surveyed in 2010 and 2012, 
respectively, recognize the medical loss ratio as a component of the ACA. Accordingly, 
other elements of the ACA may have received more attention and played a larger role in 
driving changes in share prices. These elements may have overridden the share price 
impact of the MLR requirements – either by those elements having received more 
attention (such as the individual mandate) or through those elements actually having a 
larger impact on share prices. 
The “no effect” finding and absence of statistically significant results for 
individual regulatory dates could mean many different things. For example, the market 
may have not efficiently processed the event information, due to leakage or existing 
expectations already incorporated into share prices. Alternatively, the market could have 
processed the information and concluded that it did not have a material implication on 
company or industry financial prospects. The Chaos Theory, which posits that share 
prices arise from hidden patterns that are not evident to researchers, may also be at work. 
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Thus, careful interpretation of “no result” findings must be made, and one can only 
hypothesize about the direct cause of these results. 
 
Legislative and Regulatory Event Results 
An additional story may be interpreted from the combination of the legislative and 
regulatory event categories. As discussed previously, the initial financial market response 
to the ACA legislation for insurers was negative based on the June 9, 2009 event date. 
Subsequent legislative developments were accompanied by much less significant market 
fluctuations, such that the entire category of developments (including the June 9, 2009 
date) did not produce statistically significant results. This indicates that the initially 
negative response was offset or mediated by subsequent fluctuations.  
Further, regulatory developments were generally positive, resulting in a CAAR of 
1.9% for the -3/+3 day period surrounding the event windows. This was statistically 
significant only at the p < 0.05 level for the T, Patell Z, and Boehemer tests – but still 
provides some validation that the overall market response to regulatory developments 
continued to be more positive than the initial market response to the June 9, 2009 draft. In 
summary, the initial market response was strongly negative, but as future developments 
occurred share prices improved somewhat.  
While the regulatory results alone are inconsistent with the findings of Pastor and 
Veronesi (2012), who found that on average, regulatory policy announcements causes 
share prices to decrease, when considering the share price trajectory of all events in 
aggregate, their findings are confirmed in this study. The results of this study are also 
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consistent with the findings of Engle and Ng (1993) and Ewing, Kruse, and Thompson 
(2005), who documented the tendency of markets to initially over-react to information. 
Further, Reynolds (2008) noted that initial market reactions to regulatory developments 
do not necessarily align with the actual outcome. An analogy could be made in this case 
to the initial reaction of the legislative event in comparison to the actual clarifications 
made by CMS to operationalize the MLR.  
 
In Summary 
 When reviewing the results of this study in aggregate, it is clear that the events 
associated with the ACA and the MLR in particular are associated with changes in share 
prices of publicly traded insurers. In the case of legislative events, the first opportunity 
for the market to review draft legislation including requirements related to MLR is 
associated with a significantly negative response on share prices. All other legislative 
dates have a less significant relationship to changes in share prices, perhaps because the 
information had already been incorporated into share prices with the first HELP 
Committee draft. As defined by Beaver (1968), if an event has information content it will 
lead to a change in investor judgments, as reflected in share prices; in the case of 
legislative events, only the first event date (June 9, 2009) and the release of the first draft 
of ACA legislation was deemed to have information content. 
In contrast, regulatory events generally are associated with a small positive 
change in share prices, perhaps in response to reduced uncertainty. While the hypotheses 
brought forth in this study were not upheld, the results are nonetheless of interest and 
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answer the research questions. Further, they uphold elements of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis semi-strong theory regarding how information is incorporated into share 
prices.  
 
Implications 
 After reviewing the findings of this research, the next question to answer is “who 
cares?” The response to this question will be addressed from two perspectives: from that 
of inside and outside academia.  
 Outside Academia. 
Political Environment. Of these findings, one in particular has the potential to 
provide ammunition and serve as the basis for sound bites for politicians and 
organizations seeking to lobby for change: the association between negative share prices 
and the initial HELP Committee draft. The ACA has no shortage of opponents, and an 
understanding of the negative perception of the financial markets could only add to their 
argument for repealing or significantly reducing the scope of the ACA. This ammunition 
would most likely be used by strong supporters of a free market economy and by those 
who oppose government intervention and regulation: these findings could be distilled and 
mutated into a simple version of “the ACA was drafted, and the market tanked.” 
However, these results must be considered cautiously: the association with negative share 
price fluctuations and the June 9, 2009 draft for publicly traded health insurers does not 
necessarily translate into the ultimate financial impact of the ACA in its entirety. 
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  Regulatory Perspective. From a regulatory perspective, understanding that the 
clarifications and publications introduced by CMS and other bodies were associated with 
a slightly positive change in share prices may assist in encouraging future regulatory 
interpretations of the ACA and other legislative acts. With an understanding that the 
financial markets may appreciate their actions that serve to reduce uncertainty, regulatory 
bodies may be less hesitant to issue formal publications. The level of complexity of the 
ACA itself and the need for clarity from regulatory bodies to operationalize the 
legislation may have particularly contributed to this; when facing similarly complex 
legislation, regulatory bodies may incorporate lessons from their response to the ACA to 
more quickly clarify requirements. 
 Strategic Decisions. Perhaps the most relevant future implications resulting from 
this research are those that relate to strategic decisions: as insurers and others in the 
healthcare industry understand that the financial market expected the initial provisions of 
the ACA and the MLR to be associated with an unfavorable change in insurers’ share 
prices, they are better able to consider their strategic choices. Low share prices have been 
linked to executive turnover (Maury, 2006) and Board of Director changes (Maury, 2006; 
Fisher et al., 2009). Clarifications of the drivers of decreases in share prices may assist in 
mitigating or otherwise impacting these levels of turnover. Additionally, understanding 
causes of share price fluctuations is relevant when companies are considering their capital 
and surplus balances from a regulatory perspective, in conjunction with their 
consideration of financing options. In sum, understanding the relationship between events 
and share price fluctuations (slightly positive from regulatory events, and significantly 
negative from the June 9, 2009 legislative date) serve to provide information from which 
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a variety of strategic decisions can be made. These strategic decisions must be made not 
only by the insurers themselves, but others participating in the healthcare sector given 
industry interdependencies. 
 Inside Academia. 
EMH represents a foundational basis for many financial and economic studies, 
and the results of this research uphold the semi-strong form of EMH. More importantly, 
this research answers two narrow and specific questions regarding share prices of 
publicly traded health insurers, which are one piece of the puzzle in understanding the 
ACA. We can further combine the results of this study of insurers’ share prices (“losers” 
from the first HELP Committee draft) and the findings of Borochin and Golec (2016), 
who identified hospitals as “winners” from the passage of the ACA, to begin to paint a 
picture of the nuances of the ACA supported by academic research. From an insurer 
standpoint, these results generally reflect the dialogue in the popular press about insurers’ 
premium increases, higher level of uncertainty, and insurers exiting state exchanges due 
to losses in that line of business without the certainty of ongoing risk adjustment and risk 
corridor funding (Altman, 2016). From the perspective of providers, the increased 
number of insured through Medicaid expansion, with decreased levels of charity care, are 
also contributing to improved hospital financial performance (Cunningham, Garfield, & 
Rudowitz, 2015).  
Outside of confirming an existing and well-established hypothesis relating to 
information and share prices and reinforcing conclusions reached in the popular press, the 
implications for academia resulting from this study primarily serve to identify more 
questions and highlight the need for more research. The repercussions of the ACA and 
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the MLR in particular are complex and wide-reaching, and thus there are many 
opportunities for future study that are identified from this early share price research. In 
addition to the need for a variety of qualitative studies to evaluate the impact of the ACA 
on insurers, providers, and individuals, specific quantitative research could be conducted 
in a variety of areas to expand upon existing research. 
Assessing Accuracy of Expectations. Share price fluctuations upon an 
announcement of regulations or legislation does not necessarily predict its actual 
outcome. One opportunity for future study does relate to comparing the initial 
expectations to the ultimate financial impact, similar to Reynold’s 2008 research. Better 
understanding the linkage between initial market fluctuations and ultimate impacts could 
provide significant benefit to the field of economic theory. Additionally, more work 
could be done to understand the share price impact of the actual MLR rebates in 
comparison to initial forecasts. This type of research could also be more narrowly 
focused on the pre-and post-ACA MLR impact for states with MLR requirements prior to 
the ACA. 
 For-Profit vs. Not-for-Profit. This study was focused exclusively on for-profit, 
publicly traded insurers; a similar evaluation of not-for-profit organizations could be 
developed, based on publicly traded capital debt. Significant attention has been dedicated 
to assessing differences between not-for-profit and for-profit healthcare providers – this 
research could be extended to understand the expectations of the financial markets and if 
they assessed the impact of the ACA differently between these types of organizations. 
For example, if financial markets viewed the ACA positively for not-for-profit insurers 
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but negatively for for-profit insurers, what would that indicate about the long-term 
viability of the for-profit companies as a financial investment?  
Healthcare Sector Participants. The share prices of other healthcare industry 
participants, such as pharmaceutical companies or hospitals, could be evaluated; this 
would be of particular interest given the findings of Ewing, Kruse, and Thompson (2008) 
regarding the close connections between industry participants. The results of the HIPAA 
research conducted by Khansa et al. (2012) demonstrated that one piece of legislation 
may be interpreted differently for its impact on different categories of market 
participants; it would be unsurprising if this held true for the ACA. 
Individual Insurers. An additional opportunity for future study exists in a more 
complete evaluation of CAARs for individual insurers within the overall insurer 
portfolio. For example, as outlined in Table 7, CAARs for individual companies for event 
date June 9, 2009 ranged from Assurant’s positive 7.4% to CNO Financial Health Group 
Inc.’s results of -19%. Additional analysis could be conducted to review individual 
companies’ CAAR results in light of their unique market position, including member 
mix, financial performance, and geographic span.  
Any such analysis must carefully consider that the event study methodology, 
when applied to individual companies, presents additional risks. Issues such as 
homoscedasticity, interconnectedness of market participants (Firth, 1976), and the 
potential for “winners” and “losers” resulting from the same events (Binder, 1985) all 
represent challenges in designing and interpreting an event study for individual 
companies.  
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Proxies for Share Prices. Similar to the study conducted by Borochin and Golec 
(2016), stock option pricing could be evaluated instead of share prices, extending their 
research beyond the two ACA-related dates they tested. This could be done for healthcare 
industry participants in a narrow manner (i.e., just pharmaceutical companies) or more 
broadly for a variety of sectors. As discussed previously in the context of not-for-profit 
organizations, capital debt pricing could also be used to assess investor sentiment. A 
focus on capital debt also provides an ability to evaluate not-for-profit and for-profit 
companies within the same sector in a more “apples to apples” comparison.  
Additional Dates. The current event study methodology could be used to evaluate 
judicial or political actions, either in a broad category or more narrowly for specific 
events. Event dates associated with Supreme Court rulings (similar to the initial research 
conducted by Borochin and Golec, 2016 for one date) or other judicial developments 
might assist in our understanding of the ACA market response in a more holistic manner. 
Further, debate about the ACA continues to evolve, particularly during presidential 
election cycles. This research could be conducted on an ongoing basis, incorporating 
future events as they occur. The instant availability of share price data makes this “real 
time” analysis feasible. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 To summarize, what is now known as a result of this research? The semi-strong 
form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis continues to be upheld, but that is not surprising: 
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Fama’s 2013 Nobel Prize in Economics was granted for a reason. The two hypotheses 
introduced in this study relating to the expected overall negative relationship between the 
ACA and the MLR and share prices from legislative and regulatory events were not 
supported. Regulatory developments in aggregate were found to be associated with a 
slightly positive change share prices, perhaps because of reduced uncertainty. In 
aggregate, legislative events were not associated with significant fluctuations in share 
prices for publicly traded health insurers, but upon closer investigation the initial draft of 
ACA legislation, including MLR requirements, was associated with significant and 
negative share price fluctuations. Perhaps it was on that date that the market fully 
digested the implications of the MLR and the ultimate restrictions on profitability. 
   
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  133 
 
 
 
References 
Aboody, D., Johnson, N. B., & Kasznik, R. (2010). Employee stock options and future 
firm performance: Evidence from option repricings. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, 50(1), 74-92. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.12.003 
Abraham, J. M., & Karaca-Mandic, P. (2011). Regulating the medical loss ratio: 
Implications for the individual market. American Journal of Managed Care, 
17(3), 211-24. 
Abraham, J. M., Karaca-Mandic, P., & Simon, K. (2014). How has the Affordable Care 
Act’s medical loss ratio regulation affected insurer behavior?. Medical Care, 52(4), 370-
377. doi:10.1097/MLR.0000000000000091Aetna. (2012). MLR Rebate Distribution 
Schedule. Retrieved from 
           http://www.imctr.com/Content.aspx?id=3082  
Aharony, J., & Swary, I. (1981). Effects of the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act: 
Evidence from capital markets. Journal of Finance, 36(4), 841-853. 
Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries. (2014). What is a health care sharing 
ministry? Retrieved from http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm/  
Altman, D. (2016). The ACA marketplace problems in context. Wall Street Journal. 
Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/08/29/the-aca-marketplace-
problems-in-context-and-why-they-dont-mean-obamacare-is-failing/  
American’s Health Insurance Plans. (2014). Affordable Care Act. Retrieved from 
http://www.ahip.org/Issues/Affordable-Care-Act/  
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  134 
 
 
 
Angell, M. (2013). Obamacare confronts a fiscal crisis: Why the Affordable Care Act 
doesn’t add up. New Labor Forum (Sage Publications Inc.), 22(1), 44-46. 
doi:10.1177/1095796012471306 
Ariel, R.A. (1990). High stock returns before holidays: Existence and evidence on 
possible causes. Journal of Finance (45), 1611 – 1626. 
Asper, E., & Hassan, M. (1993). The impact of PPS legislation on the systematic risk of 
hospitals.  Journal of Economics and Finance, (17), 121–35. 
Asquith, P., & Mullins, D.W. (1983). The impact of initiating dividend payments on 
shareholders' wealth. Journal of Business (56), 77-96. 
Asquith, P., & Mullins, D.W. (1986). Equity issues and offering dilution. Journal of 
Financial Economics (15), 61-89. 
Assurant, Inc. (2009). Form 8K 2009. Retrieved from SEC EDGAR website 
 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1267238/000118143109029916/000118
 1431-09-029916-index.htm  
Ball, R., & Brown, P. (1968). An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 159-178. 
Ball, R., & Brown, P. R. (2014). Ball and Brown (1968): A Retrospective. Accounting 
Review, 89(1), 1-26. doi:10.2308/accr-50604 
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1), 99-120. Retrieved from 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  135 
 
 
 
http://business.illinois.edu/josephm/BA545_Fall%202011/S10/Barney%20(1991).
pdf 
Barney, J. B., & Hesterly, W. S. (2010). VRIO framework. In strategic management and 
competitive advantage (pp. 68–86). New Jersey: Pearson. 
Beaver, W. (1968) The information content of annual earnings announcements. Journal 
of Accounting Research Supplement (6), 67–92. 
Beaver, W. (1998). Financial reporting: An accounting revolution (3rd Edition). 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.  
Bell, H. A. (2012). Velocity of information in efficient markets: A theory of market value 
change. Journal of Investing, 21(3), 55-59. 
Bertone, S., Paeglis, I., & Ravi, R. (2015). (How) has the market become more efficient?. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 5472-86. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.12.019 
Binder, J. J. (1985). Measuring the effects of regulation with stock price data. RAND 
Journal Of Economics (RAND Journal Of Economics), 16(2), 167-183. 
Binder, J. (1998). The event study methodology since 1969. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 11(2), 111-137. 
Bloom, B. N. (2012). Applications of event study methodology to lodging stock 
performance. Dissertation Abstracts International Section A, 72, 3371. 
Blumenthal, D., Abrams, M., & Nuzum, R. (2015). The Affordable Care Act at 5 years. 
New England Journal of Medicine, 372(25), 2451-2458 8p. 
doi:10.1056/NEJMhpr1503614 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  136 
 
 
 
Boehmer, E., Musumeci, J., & Poulsen, A. (1991). Event-study methodology under 
 conditions of event-induced variance. Journal of Financial Economics, 30(2), 
253-272. 
Borochin, P., & Golec, J. (2016). Using options to measure the full value-effect of an 
event: Application to Obamacare. Journal of Financial Economics, 120(1), 169-
193. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.009 
Boyd, B. (2013). Health Care Sharing Ministries: Scam or solution? Journal of Law and 
Health, 26(2), 219-283. 
Bradshaw, M., Drake, M., Myers, J., & Myers, L. (2012). A re-examination of analysts' 
superiority over time-series forecasts of annual earnings. Review of Accounting 
Studies, 17(4), 944-968. doi:10.1007/s11142-012-9185-8 
Brown, S., & Warner, J. (1985). Using daily stock returns: the case of event studies. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 3 – 31. 
Bukh, P., & Nielsen, C. (2010). Understanding the health care business model: The 
financial analysts' point of view. Journal of Health Care Finance, 37(2), 8-26 
19p. 
Campbell, J. Y., & Shiller, R. J. (1988). Stock prices, earnings, and expected dividends. 
Journal of Finance, 43(3), 661-676. 
Campbell, J.Y., Lo, A.W., & MacKinlay, A.C. (1997). The econometrics of financial 
markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  137 
 
 
 
Campbell, K., Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., & Zhou, L. (2003). The economic cost of 
publicly announced information security breaches: empirical evidence from the 
stock market. Journal of Computer Security, 11(3), 431. 
Canina, L., Michaely, R., Thaler, R. & Womack, K. (1998). Caveat compounder: A 
warning about using the daily CRSP equal weighted index to compute long-run 
excess returns. Journal of Finance, 53(1), 403-416. 
Cannan, J. (2013). A legislative history of the Affordable Care Act: How legislative 
procedure shapes legislative history. Law Library Journal, 105(2), 132 – 173. 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2014a). Medical loss ratio. Retrieved from 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-
Reforms/Medical-Loss-Ratio.html  
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2014b). Medical loss ratio data and system 
resources. Retrieved from http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-
Resources/mlr.html  
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2015). Regulations and guidance. 
Retrieved from http://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/Regulations-and-
Guidance/index.html#Medical Loss Ratio  
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2016). Accountable care organizations. 
Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/ACO/  
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  138 
 
 
 
Center for Research in Security Prices. (2015). CRSP historical index. Retrieved from 
http://www.crsp.com/products/research-products/crsp-historical-indexes  
Charest, G. (1978). Dividend information, stock returns, and market efficiency. Journal 
of Financial Economics 6, 297-330. 
Chu, K. W., Zollinger, T. W., Kelly, A. S., & Saywell, Jr. R. M. (1991). An empirical 
analysis of cash flow, working capital, and the stability of financial ratio groups in 
the hospital industry. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. Spring: 39-58. 
Colombo, J. D. (2006). The role of tax exemption in a competitive health care market. 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 31(3), 623-642. 
doi:10.1215/03616878-2005-010 
Cootner, P., Ed. (1964). The random character of stock market prices. Cambridge, MA.: 
MIT Press. 
Congressional Budget Office. (2009). Preliminary analysis of the Affordable Health 
Choices Act. Retrieved from 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/103xx/doc10310/06-15-
healthchoicesact.pdf  
Congressional Budget Office. (2015). Updated budget projections. Retrieved from 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49973-
Updated_Budget_Projections.pdf  
Conrad, D., & Shortell, S. (1996), Integrated health care systems: Promise and 
performance. Frontiers of Health Services Management, Vol. 13, pp. 3–40. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  139 
 
 
 
Cordner, S. (2015). Adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life for the public 
good: The ACA’s medical loss ratio as a constitutional regulation of health 
insurance companies. William & Mary’s Bill of Rights Journal, 24(1), 213-249. 
Corrado, C. J. (1989). A nonparametric test for abnormal security-price performance in 
event studies. Journal of Financial Economics, 23(2), 385-395. 
Cowan, A. R. (1992). Nonparametric event study tests. Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting, 2(4), 343-358. 
Craycraft, C. 1994. The incremental information content of socio-economic data in 
evaluating hospital performance. Journal of Management Systems Special Series: 
Research in Healthcare Financial Management. 6(3): 39ñ52 
Cross, F. (1973). The behavior of stock prices on Fridays and Mondays.  Financial 
Analysts Journal. 29 (November/December), 67-69. 
Cunningham, L.A. (1994). From random walks to chaotic crashes: The linear genealogy 
of the efficient capital market hypothesis. Washington Law Review 62, 546-551. 
Cunningham, P., Garfield, R., & Rudowitz, R. (2015). How are hospitals faring under the 
Affordable Care Act? The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Retrieved from 
http://kff.org/report-section/how-are-hospitals-faring-under-the-affordable-care-
act-early-experiences-from-ascension-health-issue-brief/ .  
Dann, L.V. (1981). Common stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders 
and stockholders. Journal of Financial Economics 9, 113-38. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  140 
 
 
 
Day, B., Himmelstein, D. U., Broder, M., & Woolhandler, S. (2015). The Affordable 
Care Act and medical loss ratios: No impact in first three years. International 
Journal of Health Services, 45(1), 127-131. doi:10.2190/HS.45.1.i 
Deloitte & Touche LLP. (2000), U.S. hospitals and the future of health care: A 
continuing survey (8th ed.). 
Department of Health and Human Services, 45 CFR 158, (2010). Retrieved from 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-12-01/pdf/2010-29596.pdf  
Department of Health and Human Services, 45 CFR 158, 75 FR 82277, (2010). Retrieved 
from https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/12/30/2010-32526/health-
insurance-issuers-implementing-medical-loss-ratio-mlr-requirements-under-the-
patient#h-12  
  Department of Health and Human Services, 45 CFR 158, 76 FR 76573, (2011). 
Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-07/pdf/2011-
31291.pdf  
Department of Health and Human Services, 45 CFR 158, 77 FR 28788. (2012). Retrieved 
from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-16/html/2012-11773.htm  
Department of Health and Human Services, 42 CFR Parts 422 and 423, 78 FR 31283 
(2013). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-05-23/pdf/2013-
12156.pdf  
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  141 
 
 
 
Department of Health and Human Services, 45 CFR Parts 144, 146, 147, 148, 153, 
79 FR 30239 (2014). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-05-
27/pdf/2014-11657.pdf  
Dolley, J. (1933). Characteristics and procedure of common stock split-ups. Harvard 
Business Review, 12(1), 70-81. 
Doyle, B.W. – Evaluating the wealth effects of regulation using daily stock return data: 
Some methodological issues. (Ph. D, dissertation). University of Oregon, 1985. 
Drake, M. S., Guest, N. M., & Twedt, B. J. (2014). The media and mispricing: The role 
of the business press in the pricing of accounting information. Accounting Review, 
89(5), 1673-1701. doi:10.2308/accr-50757 
Eastman, K. (2010). Regulation of health care sharing ministries. Journal of Insurance 
Regulation, 29(2), 189-206. 
Engle, R. F., & Ng, V. K. (1993). Measuring and testing the impact of news on volatility. 
Journal of Finance, 48(5), 1749-1778. 
Epstein, R.A., & Stannard, P.A. (2012). Constitutional ratemaking and the Affordable 
Care Act: A new source of vulnerability. American Journal of Law, 38, 243 – 
266.  
Ewing, B., Kruse, J., & Thompson, M. (2005). Comparing the impact of news: A tale of 
three health care sectors. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32, 1587–
611. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  142 
 
 
 
Ewing, B. T., Kruse, J. B., & Thompson, M. A. (2008). Transmission of shocks among 
health care stock index returns. Applied Financial Economics Letters, 4(1), 71-75. 
doi:10.1080/17446540701416399 
Executive Office of the President of the United States. (2016). 2015 United States Budget 
Estimate. Retrieved from http://federal-budget.insidegov.com/l/118/2015-
Estimate  
Fama, E.F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417. 
Fama, E. F. (1976). Foundations of finance. New York: Basic Books. 
Fama, E. F. (1991). Efficient capital markets: II. Journal of Finance, 46(5), 1575-1617. 
Fama, E.F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 49(3), 283-306. 
Faulkender, M., & Petersen, M. A. (2006). Does the source of capital affect capital 
structure?. Review of Financial Studies, 19(1), 45-79. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj003 
Feltham, G.A , & Ohlson, J.A. (1999). Residual earnings valuation with risk and 
stochastic interest rates. Accounting Review, 74, 165–183 
Findlay, M., & Williams, E. (2000). A fresh look at the efficient market hypothesis: how 
the intellectual history of finance encouraged a real 'fraud-on-the-market'. Journal 
of Post Keynesian Economics, 23(2), 181. 
Firth, M. (1976). The impact of earnings announcements on the share price behavior of 
similar type firms. Economic Journal, 86(342), 296-306. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  143 
 
 
 
Fischer, P. E., Gramlich, J. D., Miller, B. P., & White, H. D. (2009). Investor perceptions 
of board performance: Evidence from uncontested director elections. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics, 48(2/3), 172-189. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.09.002 
Folland, S., & Kleiman, R. (1990) The effect of prospective payment under DRGs on the 
market value of hospitals. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 30, 50–
68 
Fontenot, S. F. (2014). The medical loss ratio: A core component of reform. Physician 
Executive, 40(4), 86-89. 
.Fraser, M. (2014). The Affordable Care attack. New Labor Forum (Sage Publications 
Inc.), 23(1), 96-98. doi:10.1177/1095796013513011 
French, K.R., (1980). Stock returns and the weekend effect. Journal of Financial 
Economics 8, 55-69. 
Friedman, M. (1953). Essays in positive economics. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Gehrig, T., & Haas, M. (2014). Lehman Brothers: What did markets know? European 
Corporate Governance Institute. Retrieved from http://www.eea-
esem.com/files/papers/EEA-ESEM/2014/2489/Gehrig_Haas.pdf  
Giaimo, S. (2013). Behind the scenes of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: 
The making of a health care co-op. Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law, 
38(3), 599-610. doi:10.1215/03616878-2079532 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  144 
 
 
 
Gibbons, M.R., & Hess, P. (1981). Day of the week effects and asset returns. Journal of 
Business 54, 3-27 
Gilson, R. J., & Kraakman, R. (2014). Market efficiency after the financial crisis: It’s still 
a matter of information costs. Virginia Law Review, 100(2), 313-376. 
Goldman, S. M. (2011). The wellness prescription. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 
28(1), 87-91. doi:10.1108/07363761111101985 
Gray, B.H. (1993). Ownership matters: Health reform and the future of 
nonprofit health care." Inquiry, 30, 352-361. 
Grey, M. R. (2009). Health insurance cooperatives: Lessons from the Great Depression. 
JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association, 302(23), 2587-2588. 
doi:10.1001/jama.2009.1856 
Grossman, S. J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient 
markets. American Economic Review, 70(3), 393. 
Hader, A. L. (2015). Affordable Care Act: Turning reporting requirements into an 
effective strategy. AORN Journal, 101(2), 270-273 4p. 
doi:10.1016/j.aorn.2014.11.005 
Harrington, S. E. (2013). Medical Loss Ratio regulation under the Affordable Care Act. 
Inquiry (00469580), 50(1), 9-26. doi:10.5034/inquiryjrnl_50.01.05 
Hartman M,, Martin A.B,, Lassman D., & Catlin A. (2015). National health spending in 
2013: Growth slows, remains in step with overall economy. Health Affairs, 34(1): 
150-160.  
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  145 
 
 
 
Hayes, E. (2016). Why ‘Risk Adjustment’ was fatal for the co-op and great for Kaiser. 
Portland Business Journal. Retrieved from 
http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/health-care-inc/2016/07/why-risk-
adjustment-was-fatal-for-the-co-op-and.html  
Health Affairs. (2016). Access To care and affordability have improved following 
Affordable Care Act implementation; Problems Remain. Health Affairs, 35(1), 
161-168 8p. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2015.0755 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010). Retrieved 
from http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/healthcareandeducationreconciliationact.pdf  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/17/AR2009081702965.html?hpid=topnews  
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029. (2010).  
Herman, B. (2014). Insurer rebates under ACA loss-ratio rule fall in 2013. Modern 
Healthcare, 44(30), 14. 
Herring, B., & Trish, E. (2015). Explaining the growth in U.S. healthcare spending using 
state level variation in income, insurance, and provider market dynamics. 
INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and 
Financing, 52, 0046958015618971. 
Hilzenrath, D., & MacGillis, A. (2009). Health cooperatives gain backing as alternative 
to public option. Washington Post. Retrieved from 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  146 
 
 
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/17/AR2009081702965.html?hpid=topnews  
Hwang, T. J. (2013). Stock market returns and clinical trial results of investigational 
compounds: An event study analysis of large biopharmaceutical companies. Plos 
ONE, 8(8), 1-8. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0071966 
Insurance Information Institute. (2016). Health insurance. Retrieved from 
http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/health-insurance.  
International Monetary Fund. (2010). Understanding financial interconnectedness. 
Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/100410.pdf  
Jacobson, C. (1994) Investor response to health care cost containment legislation: Is 
American health policy designed to fail?,Academy of Management Journal, 37, 
440–52. 
Jayne, O., & Paul, O. (n.d). Insurance plan choices paltry in some areas. USA Today. 
Jensen, M. C. (1978), Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 6, 95–101 
Kaiser Family Foundation (2012). Kaiser health tracking poll. Retrieved from 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8285-f.pdf 
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2014). Health reform implementation timeline. Retrieved 
from http://kff.org/interactive/implementation-timeline/.  
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  147 
 
 
 
Kaiser Health News. (2014). FAQ on ACO’s: Accountable Care Organizations, 
Explained. Retrieved from http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/aco-accountable-
care-organization-faq/  
Karaca-Mandic, P., Abraham, J. M., & Simon, K. (2015). Is the medical loss ratio a good 
target measure for regulation in the individual market for health insurance? 
Health Economics, 24(1), 55-74. doi:10.1002/hec.3002 
Khansa, L., Cook, D. F., James, T., & Bruyaka, O. (2012). Impact of HIPAA provisions 
on the stock market value of healthcare institutions, and information security and 
other information technology firms. Computers & Security, 31(6), 750-770. 
Kilbridge, P. (2003). The cost of HIPAA compliance. New England Journal of Medicine. 
pp. 1423-1424. doi:10.1056/NEJMp030020. 
Kogan, L., Ross, S. A., Wang, J., & Westerfield, M. M. (2006). The price impact and 
survival of irrational traders. Journal of Finance, 61, 195–229 
Kothari, S. (2001). Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, 31(1-3), 105-231. 
Kothari, S. P., & Warner, J.B. (2006). Econometrics of event studies, in: B. Eckbo Espen, 
(Ed.), Handbook of corporate finance: Empirical corporate finance (Handbooks 
in Finance Series, Elsevier, North-Holland), 3–36. 
Kudo, M., Yong Jae, K., Walker, M., & Connaughton, D. P. (2015). The influence of title 
sponsorships in sports events on stock price returns. International Journal of 
Sports Marketing & Sponsorship, 16(2), 118-137. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  148 
 
 
 
Lamdin, D. J. (2001). Implementing and interpreting event studies of regulatory changes. 
Journal of Economics and Business, 53(2-3), 171-183. 
Larcker, D. F., Ormazabal, G., & Taylor, D. J. (2011). The market reaction to Corporate 
Governance Regulation. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), 431-448. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.georgefox.idm.oclc.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.002 
Lawrence, C. M., & Kurtenbach, J. M. (1995). Medicare reimbursement, debt financing, 
and measures of service efforts and accomplishments in the healthcare industry. 
International Journal of Public Administration, 18(2/3): 355-381 
Lawrence, J. (2013). Health Care Reform in 2013. New Jersey Banker, 33. 
Lee, C.M. (1992). Earnings news and small trades: An intraday analysis. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 15, pp. 265–302 
Lee, C. M. (2001). Market efficiency and accounting research: a discussion of 'capital 
market research in accounting' by S.P. Kothari. Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, 31(1-3), 233-253. 
Lintner, J. (1965). The valuation of risky assets and the selection of risky investments in 
stock portfolios and capital budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics, 47, 13–
37 
Lo, A.W. & MacKinlay, A.C. (1999). A non-random walk down Wall Street. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  149 
 
 
 
Lo, A. W., Mamaysky, H. & Wang, J. (2000). Foundations of technical analysis: 
Computational algorithms, statistical inference, and empirical implementation. 
Journal of Finance, 8, 55:4, 1705-765. 
Luhby, T. (2014). Medicare vs. private insurance: Which costs less. CNN. Retrieved from 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/21/news/economy/medicare-doctors/  
Maher, J. N. (2012). The corporate profit motive & questionable public relations 
practices during the lead-up to the Affordable Care Act. Journal of Law and 
Health, 25(1), 1-39. 
Malkiel, B.G. (2003). The efficient market hypothesis and its critics. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 17(1), 59-82. 
Maury, B. (2006). Corporate Performance, corporate governance and top executive 
turnover in Finland. European Financial Management, 12(2), 221-248. 
doi:10.1111/j.1354-7798.2006.00317.x 
McCue, M. J., & Hall, M. (2015). Health insurers’ financial performance and quality 
improvement expenditures in the Affordable Care Act’s second year. Medical 
Care Research & Review, 72(1), 113-122. doi:10.1177/1077558714563172 
McCue, M., Hall, M., & Xinliang, L. (2013). Impact of medical loss regulation on the 
financial performance of health insurers. Health Affairs, 32(9), 1546-1551. 
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2013.1316 
McCue, M. J., &. Ozcan, Y. A. (1992). Determinants of capital structure. Hospital 
and Health Services Administration, 37, pp.333-346. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  150 
 
 
 
Meyer, A. (2016). Most Obamacare Co-Ops have now failed. Washington Free Beacon. 
Retrieved from http://freebeacon.com/issues/most-obamacare-coops-have-now-
failed/ 
Morgan, G., Leech, N., Gloeckner, G., & Barrett, K. (2004). SPSS for introductory 
statistics: Use and interpretation (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
Mulherin, J. H. (2007). Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues 
in securities markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2-3), 421-437. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.georgefox.idm.oclc.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.02.005 
National Center for Employee Ownership. (2015). A brief overview of employee 
ownership in the U.S. Retrieved from http://www.nceo.org/articles/employee-
ownership-esop-united-states  
New York Stock Exchange. (2016). NYSE Composite Index (NYA). Retrieved from 
https://www.nyse.com/quote/index/NYA  
Nichols, D. C., & Wahlen, J. M. (2004). How do earnings numbers relate to stock 
returns? A review of classic accounting research with updated evidence. 
Accounting Horizons, 18(4), 263-286. 
Nussbaum, A. (2013). Health insurance: Now sold in stores. Businessweek.Com, 11. 
Obama, B. (2015) Statement by the President on the Fifth Anniversary of the Affordable 
Care Act. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/03/22/statement-president-fifth-anniversary-affordable-care-act 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  151 
 
 
 
Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, OCIIO-9998-IFC, (2010). 
Retrieved from 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/mlr_20101122_technica
l_appendix.pdf 
Pastor, L., & Veronesi, P. (2012). Uncertainty about government policy and stock prices. 
Journal of Finance, 67(4), 1219-1264. 
Patell, J.M. (1976). Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior: 
Empirical tests. Journal of Accounting Research, 14(2), 246-276. 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010). Retrieved 
from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/html/PLAW-
111publ148.htm  
Peterson, P. P. (1989). Event studies: A review of issues and methodology. Quarterly 
Journal of Business & Economics, 28(3), 36. 
Priebus, R. (2015). RNC Statement on ObamaCare Anniversary. Retrieved from 
https://www.gop.com/rnc-statement-on-obamacare-anniversary/?  
Pear, R., & Harris, G. (2009). Alternate plan as health option muddies debate. New York 
Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/health/policy/18plan.html?ref=politics&_r=
0  
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  152 
 
 
 
Pink, G., Brown, A., Studer, M., Reiter, K., & Leatt, P. (2006). Pay-for-performance in 
publicly financed healthcare: some international experience and considerations for 
Canada. Healthcare Papers, 6(4), 8-26. 
Quandl Financial and Economic Data. (2016). Stock prices end of day, current and 
historical. Retrieved from https://www.quandl.com/browse?idx=database-
browser_stock-data_united-states_stock-prices-end-of-day-current-and-historical  
Radnofsky, L., & Mathews, A. (2014). Some insurers cancel plans. Wall Street Journal - 
Eastern Edition. p. A3. 
Reiter, K., Wheeler, J., & Smith, D. (2008). Liquidity constraints on hospital investment 
when credit markets are tight. Journal of Health Care Finance, 35(1), 24-33 10p. 
Reynolds, K. M. (2008). Anticipated vs realized benefits: Can event studies be used to 
predict the impact of new regulations. Eastern Economic Journal, 34(3), 310-324. 
doi:10.1057/palgrave.eej.9050036 
Roane, D. (2014). Tax practice corner. Journal of Accountancy, 217(3), 62-63. 
Robinson, J. C. (1997). Use and abuse of the medical loss ratio to measure health plan 
performance. Health Affairs, 16(4), 176. 
Rose, C. (2003). Impact of investor meetings/presentations on share prices, insider 
trading and securities regulation. International Review of Law & Economics, 
23(3), 227. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2003.09.001 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  153 
 
 
 
Rosenau, P. V., & Linder, S. H. (2003). Two decades of research comparing for-profit 
and nonprofit health provider performance in the United States. Social Science 
Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell), 84(2), 219-241. doi:10.1111/1540-6237.8402001 
Salinger, M. (1992). Standard errors in event studies. Journal of Financial & 
Quantitative Analysis, 27(1), 39-53. 
Schlesinger, M., & Gray, B. H. (2006). How nonprofits matter in American medicine, 
and what to do about it. Health Affairs, 25, W287-W303. 
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.25.w287 
Schlesinger, M., Gray, B., & Bradley, E. (1996). Charity and community: The role of 
nonprofit ownership in a managed health care system. Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy & Law, 21(4), 697-750. 
Schlesinger, M., Mitchell, S., & Gray, B. (2003). Measuring community benefits 
provided by nonprofit and for-profit HMOs. Inquiry (00469580), 40(2), 114-132. 
Schlesinger, M., Mitchell, S., & Gray, B. H. (2004). Public expectations of nonprofit and 
for-profit ownership in American medicine: Clarifications and implications. 
Health Affairs, 23(6), 181-191. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.23.6.181 
Schildkraut, J. L., Baker, C. A., Cho, K. N., & Reuss, K. L. (2015). The National 
Compensation Survey and the Affordable Care Act: Preserving quality health care 
data. Monthly Labor Review, 1-11. 
Schwert, G.W. (1981). Using financial data to measure effects of regulation. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 24. 121-158. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  154 
 
 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission. (2015). Division of Corporation Finance: Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code List. Retrieved from 
https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm  
Sherman, H. D. 1986. Financial reporting: Interpreting hospital performance with 
financial statement analysis. The Accounting Review, 3: 526ñ550 
Shiller, R. J. (1984). Stock prices and social dynamics. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, (2), 457–510 
Sloan, F.A., Valvona, J., Hassan, M. & Morrisey, M.A. (1988). Cost of capital to the 
hospital sector. Journal of Health Economics, 7, pp. 25 45. 
Smith, R. T., Bradley, M., & Jarrell, G. (1986). Studying firm-specific effects of 
regulation with stock market data: an application to oil price regulation. RAND 
Journal of Economics, 17(4), 467-489 
Topping, S., Carroll, C. & Lindley, J. (1997) The impact of health care reform on capital 
acquisition for hospitals. Financial Review, 32, 751–78. 
Turnbull, N., & Kane, N. M. (1999). The impact of accounting and actuarial practice 
differences on medical loss ratios. An Inquiry (00469580), 36(3), 343. 
Ungar, R. (2011a). More proof that the American for-profit health insurance model is 
doomed. Forbes. Retrieved from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/12/28/more-proof-that-the-american-
for-profit-health-insurance-model-is-doomed/  
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  155 
 
 
 
Ungar R. (2011b). The bomb buried in Obamacare explodes today—Hallelujah! Forbes. 
Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/12/02/the-bomb-
buried-in-obamacare-explodes-today-halleluja/ 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2014). Key features of the 
Affordable Care Act. Retrieved from 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/index.html  
United States Senate Committee on Finance. (2009). Baucus, pharmaceutical companies 
announce deal to reduce prescription drug costs for seniors. Retrieved from 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/baucus-pharmaceutical-
companies-announce-deal-to-reduce-prescription-drug-costs-for-seniors 
Watkins, A. L. (2000). Hospital financial ratio classification patterns revisited: Upon 
considering nonfinancial information. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 
19, 73-95. 
Watkins, A. L., & Brenner, V. C. (2003). Regulating external reporting in the municipal 
bond market: The relevance of nonfinancial information in evaluating hospital 
financial performance. Accounting and the Public Interest, 321-35. 
Wedig, G., Sloan, F.A., Hassan, M., & Morrisey, M.A.. (1988). Capital structure, 
ownership, and capital payment policy: The case of hospitals. Journal of Finance 
43, 21-40. 
Weixel, N. (2014). Business stakeholders object to reporting, other ACA provisions. 
Managing Benefits Plans, 16(9), 3-4. 
PUBLIC COMPANY HEALTH INSURERS AND MEDICAL LOSS 
RATIOS  156 
 
 
 
White House. (2009). Coming together, bringing down costs. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/05/11/coming-together-bringing-down-
costs. 
Zhang, X. (2000). Conservative accounting and equity valuation. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 29, 125–149. 
Zigmond, J. (2012). Insurers fail to impress. Modern Healthcare, 42(25), 10. 
 
 
 
